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PROBABLE CAUSE WITH TEETH 
CYNTHIA LEE* 
Introduction 
The Supreme Court has not provided much clarity about how 
much evidence is enough to support a finding of probable cause. It 
has said that probable cause is more than a mere suspicion and less 
than proof necessary to convict, i.e., proof beyond a reasonable 
doubt.1 This, however, tells us little since “more than a mere 
suspicion” is any amount of suspicion over zero, which is not much 
evidence at all, and “proof beyond a reasonable doubt” is the highest 
evidentiary standard—enough to convince a jury to convict 
someone. In 1983, a plurality of the Court provided us with a little 
more guidance with respect to how much evidence is necessary for 
probable cause. In Texas v. Brown, Justice Rehnquist moved the 
needle significantly when he wrote that probable cause “does not 
demand any showing that such a belief be correct or more likely true 
than false.”2 According to Justice Rehnquist and three other Justices 
more than three decades ago, probable cause means less certainty 
than the preponderance of the evidence standard that governs in civil 
cases. 
Since 1983, lower courts and legal scholars alike have repeated 
Justice Rehnquist’s statement on probable cause as if it were well 
settled law. In repeating this language, few have acknowledged that 
Texas v. Brown was just a plurality opinion—Justice Rehnquist was 
not able to get four other Justices to agree with him in 1983 that 
probable cause means something less than a preponderance of the 
evidence.3 More importantly, since 1983, a majority of the Court has 
* Cynthia Lee is the Charles Kennedy Poe Research Professor of Law at The
George Washington University Law School. She thanks Andrew Crespo, Andrew
Ferguson, and Jordan Blair Woods for their helpful feedback during the ABA
Criminal Justice Section Academic Roundtables in Washington, DC on
November 1, 2018. She also thanks Jack Chin, Ashima Gray, Jennifer Chacon, Ji
Seon Song, and Jonathan Glater for helpful feedback when she presented it as a
work-in-progress at CAPALF and Western POC at UNLV School of Law in Las
Vegas, Nevada on October 20, 2018. Most of all, she thanks Stephanie Hansen
and Casey Matsumoto for excellent research assistance on this Article.
1 Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 175 (1949).
2 Texas v. Brown, 460 U.S. 730, 742 (1983).
3 The issue before the Supreme Court was whether the seizure of a balloon fell
within the plain view doctrine. Texas v. Brown, 460 U.S. 730, 732–33 (1983).
Nonetheless, hundreds of lower courts have repeated Justice Rehnquist’s
language as if it were settled law. See infra notes   -  .
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never repeated Justice Rehnquist’s statement that probable cause is 
something less than a preponderance of the evidence.   
This Article argues that Justice Rehnquist’s musings on the 
meaning of probable cause in Texas v. Brown should not be 
followed. Just how much evidence is necessary to support a finding 
of probable cause is an important question since probable cause is 
all that is required to validate an arrest in a public place.4 Once a law 
enforcement officer has validly arrested an individual and taken the 
arrestee into custody, that arrest gives the officer the authority to 
conduct a full search of the arrestee’s person,5 including a search of 
any containers found on the arrestee.6 Incident to that lawful 
custodial arrest, the officer can also search anything within the 
arrestee’s wingspan or grabbing distance.7 If the arrestee is an 
occupant or recent occupant of a vehicle, the officer can search the 
passenger compartment of the vehicle if the arrestee is unsecured 
and within reaching distance of the passenger compartment or if the 
officer has reason to believe there is evidence of the crime of arrest 
in the vehicle.8 As part of the booking process, an arrestee can be 
subjected to a strip search prior to being introduced into the jail’s 
general population even if there is no particularized reason to 
suspect the arrestee of hiding contraband or evidence in his or her 
body cavities.9 If the arrest is for a serious offense, an officer may 
collect the arrestee’s DNA without a warrant without violating the 
                                                             
4 United States v. Watson, 423 U.S. 411 (1976) (holding that a warrantless arrest 
in public based on probable cause did not violate the Fourth Amendment). 
Probable cause is also needed for an arrest warrant, which gives an officer the 
authority to arrest an individual in his or her own home. Payton v. New York, 445 
U.S. 573 (1980). 
5 United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218 (1973). 
6 Id. This rule, however, does not apply to smartphones. If the officer finds a 
smartphone on the arrestee’s person, the officer must get a search warrant before 
searching that smartphone. Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473, 2495 (2014) 
(“Our answer to the question of what police must do before searching a cell phone 
seized incident to an arrest is accordingly simple—get a warrant.”). For excellent 
commentary on cell phone searches and the Fourth Amendment prior to the Riley 
decision, see Adam M. Gershowitz, The iPhone Meets the Fourth Amendment, 56 
UCLA L. REV. 27 (2008). 
7 Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752 (1969). Lower courts have interpreted the 
term “wingspan” very liberally. See, e.g., United States v. Tejada, 524 F.3d 809, 
811–12 (7th Cir. 2008) (finding that an entertainment center in the living room 
was within the defendant’s grabbing distance, even though defendant was 
handcuffed, lying face down, and surrounded by police officers in the kitchen at 
the time of the search); United States v. Nascimento, 491 F.3d 25, 50–51 (1st Cir. 
2007) (finding that a cabinet in a closet eight to ten feet away was within the 
defendant’s immediate control); see also Watkins v. United States, 564 F.2d 201, 
203, 205 (6th Cir. 1977) (permitting officers to seize a gun under a mattress in a 
bedroom after officers escorted arrestee into that bedroom).  
8 Arizona v. Gant, 556 U.S. 332 (2009). 
9 Florence v. Board of Chosen Freeholders, 566 U.S. 318 (2012). 
 
3 PROBABLE CAUSE WITH TEETH [August-15-19] 
 
 
 
Fourth Amendment.10 That individual’s DNA can then be checked 
against DNA collected in past unsolved crimes—even though the 
individual has not yet been tried, let alone found guilty of any 
crime.11 Aside from the collection of DNA, all of the above can be 
done even if one is only arrested for a minor offense, including a 
minor traffic offense punishable by only a fine with no jail time.12 
In short, probable cause gives the officer the authority to do a whole 
lot more than just arrest an individual and take that individual into 
custody. This is particularly concerning when one considers that on 
average, law enforcement officers in the United States make 29,000 
arrests each day.13  
While this Article focuses on the probable cause standard for 
arrests, probable cause is also the level of justification required for 
many other things besides an arrest. Consider all the ways probable 
cause matters for purposes of criminal investigation. Perhaps most 
obviously, probable cause is the standard for issuance of a warrant 
to search or arrest.14 The Fourth Amendment explicitly states, “no 
Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause . . .”15 As a general 
matter, probable cause is also required for warrantless searches.16 
Probable cause is needed before an officer can conduct a warrantless 
                                                             
10 Maryland v. King, 569 U.S. 435, 465–66 (2013) (“When officers make an arrest 
supported by probable cause to hold for a serious offense and they bring the 
suspect to the station to be detained in custody, taking and analyzing a cheek swab 
of the arrestee’s DNA is, like fingerprinting and photographing, a legitimate 
police booking procedure that is reasonable under the Fourth Amendment”). 
11 To allay concerns raised by some legislators and the public defender's office, 
proponents of Maryland’s law allowing police to collect DNA samples from 
persons arrested for serious crimes “agreed to a provision that requires that 
suspects' DNA be thrown out if they are acquitted or their cases are dropped.” Ian 
Duncan, Police in Md. holding DNA on people not convicted of crimes, 
BALTIMORE SUN (Feb. 28, 2013, 10:00 PM), 
https://www.baltimoresun.com/news/maryland/sun-investigates/bs-md-dna-
databases-20130228-story.html; Md. Code Ann., Pub. Safety § 2-504(d)(2)(i) (“If 
all qualifying criminal charges are determined to be unsupported by probable 
cause: (i) the DNA sample shall be immediately destroyed”).   
12 Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, 532 U.S. 318 (2001). See also Wayne A. Logan, 
Reasonableness as a Rule: A Paean to Justice O'Connor's Dissent in Atwater v. 
City of Lago Vista, 79 Miss. L.J. 115 (2009) (examining Justice Sandra Day 
O’Connor’s dissent in  Atwater v. City of Lago Vista). 
13 Lozman v. City of Riviera Beach, 138 S. Ct. 1945, 1953 (2018) (“There are on 
average about 29,000 arrests per day in this country”) (slip opinion at 9), citing 
U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, FED. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, UNIFORM CRIME 
REPORT, CRIME IN THE UNITED STATES, 2016 (2017). 
14 U.S. CONST. amend. IV. The U.S. Supreme Court equates probable cause to 
search with probable cause to arrest. William C. Moul, Probable Cause: The 
Federal Standard, 25 OHIO ST. L.J. 502, 513 (1964). 
15 Id. 
16 New Jersey v. TLO, 469 U.S. 325, 340 (1985) (“Ordinarily, a search—even one 
that may permissibly be carried out without a warrant—must be based upon 
‘probable cause’ to believe that a violation of the law has occurred.”). 
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search of a motor vehicle under the automobile exception to the 
warrant requirement.17 Probable cause is needed before an officer 
can make a warrantless entry into a home under the exigent 
circumstances exception to the warrant requirement.18 Probable 
cause is needed for a plain view search or seizure.19  Probable cause 
enables an officer to shoot a fleeing felon. If an officer has probable 
cause to believe a fleeing felon poses a threat of serious physical 
harm to the officer or others, that officer can even use deadly force 
to stop the suspect.20 If an officer has probable cause to believe a 
driver has committed a civil traffic offense, the officer may pull over 
the driver even if the real reason for the stop was because the officer 
had a mere hunch that the driver was engaged in criminal activity 
and even if the officer based this hunch on the driver’s race.21 When 
an individual has been arrested and taken into custody without an 
arrest warrant, a judicial determination of probable cause is needed 
to continue holding the individual.22 Recently, the Supreme Court 
held that probable cause to arrest will defeat most claims of 
retaliatory arrest.23 
                                                             
17 Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 155–56, 162 (1925) (holding that a 
warrantless seizure of an automobile based upon probable cause to believe the 
vehicle contains contraband liquor does not contravene the Fourth Amendment); 
United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798, 800 (1982) (a warrantless search of an 
automobile under the automobile exception properly includes a probing search of 
compartments and containers within the automobile so long as officers have 
legitimately stopped the vehicle and  have probable cause to believe contraband 
is concealed somewhere within the vehicle).  
18 Kirk v. Louisiana, 536 U.S. 635, 638 (2002) (“noting that police officers need 
either a warrant or probable cause plus exigent circumstances in order to make a 
lawful entry into a home.”). 
19 Arizona v. Hicks, 480 U.S. 321, 326 (1987) (holding that probable cause is 
required in order to invoke the plain view doctrine). 
20 Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1, 11-12 (1985) (“Where the officer has probable 
cause to believe that the suspect poses a threat of serious physical harm, either to 
the officer or to others, it is not constitutionally unreasonable to prevent escape 
by using deadly force” if, where feasible, some warning has been given).  
21 Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 819 (1996) (the lower court’s finding 
that the officers had probable cause to believe that petitioners had violated the 
traffic code made the stop reasonable under the Fourth Amendment). 
22 See Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 125 (1975) (“[The State] must provide a 
fair and reliable determination of probable cause as a condition for any significant 
pretrial restraint of liberty, and this determination must be made by a judicial 
officer either before or promptly after arrest.”). 
23 Nieves v. Bartlett, ___ U.S. ____ (2019) (holding that probable cause will 
generally defeat a claim of retaliatory arrest). If a case involves an arrest pursuant 
to an official policy of retaliation, probable cause to arrest will not categorically 
bar a defendant from claiming retaliatory arrest. Lozman v. City of Riviera Beach, 
585 U.S. ____, ____ (2018) (slip op. at 10). For an excellent critique of the Nieves 
v. Bartlett decision, see Garrett Epps, John Roberts Strikes a Blow Against Free 
Speech, THE ATLANTIC, June 3, 2019, available at 
https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2019/06/nieves-v-bartlett-john-
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Beyond the Fourth Amendment search and seizure context, 
probable cause is all that is needed for a prosecutor to charge an 
individual with a crime.24 Probable cause is also all that is needed 
before a grand jury can issue an indictment.25 Probable cause is also 
the standard applied by a magistrate judge deciding at a preliminary 
hearing whether to bind over the defendant for trial.26 Clarifying and 
strengthening the meaning of probable cause is thus important, not 
only because it will help protect innocent individuals from the harms 
of a custodial arrest, but also because it can help protect individuals 
against unjust searches and prosecutions.  
                                                             
roberts-protects-police/590881/ or https://perma.cc/Z7CB-AMTD (noting that 
the Nieves decision “will make it harder to hold officers to account when they—
as we all know they sometimes do—arrest citizens in retaliation for speech they 
don’t like” even though the First Amendment makes clear that “[a]n individual 
should not face official retaliation for engaging in ‘protected speech’ alone, even 
when that speech is unpleasant or hostile”). 
24 Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357, 364 (1978) (“In our system, so long as 
the prosecutor has probable cause to believe that the accused committed an 
offense defined by statute, the decision whether or not to prosecute, and what 
charge to file or bring before a grand jury, generally rests entirely in his 
discretion.”).  
25 Federal grand jurors are told that probable cause is “[t]he finding necessary in 
order to return an indictment against a person accused of a federal crime” and that 
“[a] finding of probable cause is proper only when the evidence presented to the 
grand jury, without any explanation being offered by the accused, persuades 12 
or more grand jurors that a federal crime has probably been committed by the 
person accused.” HANDBOOK FOR FEDERAL GRAND JURORS (“The grand jury . . . 
does not determine guilt or innocence, but only whether there is probable cause 
to believe that a crime was committed and that a specific person or persons 
committed it”).  For an excellent discussion of probable cause as the standard to 
indict or bind over a defendant for trial, see William Ortman, Probable Cause 
Revisited, 68 STAN. L. REV. 511 (2016) (arguing that probable cause is 
problematic and should be abandoned as the standard used in grand jury 
indictments and preliminary hearings). 
26 Barber v. Page, 390 U.S. 719, 725 (1968) (holding that the function of a 
preliminary hearing is “determining whether probable cause exists to hold the 
accused for trial”). In Morrissey v. Brewer, the Court noted that probable cause in 
the parole revocation context is akin to probable cause in the preliminary hearing 
context, and defined probable cause as a reasonable ground to believe. Morrissey 
v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 485 (1972) (noting that when a parolee has been accused 
of violating parole, the parolee is entitled to an inquiry and “[s]uch an inquiry 
should be seen in the nature of a ‘preliminary hearing’ to determine whether there 
is probable cause or reasonable ground to believe that the arrested parolee has 
committed acts that would constitute a violation of parole conditions”). While the 
Supreme Court has never suggested that probable cause in the preliminary hearing 
context is more stringent than probable cause in the arrest context, one lower court 
has suggested that probable cause in the context of a preliminary hearing requires 
a higher showing than probable cause in the arrest context. Williams v. Kobel, 
789 F.2d 463, 469 (7th Cir. 1986) (“it is clear to us that the probable cause 
determination at the preliminary hearing is far more stringent and far more 
concerned with legal technicalities than the probable cause determination made 
by an arresting officer”). 
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Recent arrests of African Americans for conduct that rarely 
leads to police intervention when non-African Americans are 
involved in similar activity highlight the need for more attention to 
the question of what is required to constitute probable cause to arrest 
an individual. Such incidents include the April 2018 arrest of two 
African American men at a Philadelphia Starbucks store27 and the 
arrest of twenty-one African American partygoers in a vacant house 
in Northeast D.C. that culminated in a 2018 Supreme Court decision 
on probable cause.28 Accordingly, one of the goals of this Article is 
to shed light on the Supreme Court’s very unclear probable cause 
jurisprudence. Adding clarity to the law, however, is not the only 
objective of this Article. The primary objective of this Article is to 
persuade lower courts not to follow Justice Rehnquist’s description 
of probable cause in Texas v. Brown.  
This Article proceeds in three parts. Part I provides an overview 
of the Supreme Court's modern jurisprudence on probable cause.29  
Two themes frame the analysis in this part: (1) the Court’s lack of 
clarity regarding the meaning of probable cause, and (2) the Court’s 
tendency in its probable cause jurisprudence to defer to the 
government instead of the individual who was searched or arrested.  
Part II focuses on Justice Rehnquist’s statement in Texas v. 
Brown that probable cause does not demand a showing that the 
officer’s belief in criminal activity be “more likely true than false.” 
I show that almost every single lower court that has considered the 
meaning of probable cause has repeated this language as if it were 
settled law. Even a few prominent legal scholars have cited this 
language as if it were settled law.  
Part III argues that Texas v. Brown should not be viewed as 
settled law for several reasons. First, thirty-five years ago, Justice 
Rehnquist was only able to get three other Justices to sign onto his 
opinion. Texas v. Brown was just a plurality opinion, and his 
statement on the showing required for a finding of probable cause 
was not necessary to the judgment.  
Second, Justice Rehnquist’s view of probable cause is wrong as 
a matter of history, precedent, and logic. It is wrong as a matter of 
history because it goes against the framers’ desire to constrain the 
discretion of searching officials. It is wrong as a matter of precedent 
because prior to Texas v. Brown, the Supreme Court had never 
suggested that the degree of belief associated with probable cause is 
less than a preponderance of the evidence. Moreover, since Texas v. 
                                                             
27 See infra text accompanying notes ___ - ____. 
28 District of Columbia v. Wesby, 138 S. Ct. 577 (2018). 
29 For a more complete history of the Court’s probable cause jurisprudence, see 
Craig S. Lerner, The Reasonableness of Probable Cause, 81 TEX. L. REV. 951 
(2003) (noting that the Supreme Court's probable cause jurisprudence predates the 
Warren Court's Aguilar and Spinelli decisions). 
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Brown was decided in 1983, a majority of the Court has never 
endorsed Justice Rehnquist’s stunted characterization of probable 
cause. The Court has been quite steadfast in its view that judicial 
magistrates have broad discretion when assessing whether an officer 
had probable cause to arrest or search. It is also wrong as a matter 
of logic since the term probable cause itself suggests that it must be 
probable, i.e., more likely than not, that the person being arrested 
has committed a crime. When an officer says I have probable cause 
to believe a crime has been committed and that A committed that 
crime, the officer is essentially claiming he has reasonable grounds 
for believing that A committed a crime or that there is a fair 
probability that A committed a crime. It simply does not make 
logical sense to say at the same time that this means the officer 
thinks there is a less than 50-50 chance that A has committed a 
crime. 
Finally, Justice Rehnquist’s view of probable cause allows for, 
and perhaps even encourages, racial disparity in arrests. Lowering 
the threshold of certainty needed for probable cause makes it easier 
for officers to arrest individuals. Police officers, however, cannot 
arrest every single person for whom they have probable cause to 
arrest and, necessarily, will exercise their discretion in choosing 
who they actually arrest. While law enforcement officers may not 
intend to discriminate on the basis of race, racial stereotypes are 
likely to color their perceptions of who seems suspicious to them 
and who, therefore, is worthy of arrest. An extremely low threshold 
of certainty for probable cause means the bulk of these arrests will 
be deemed justifiable. Racial disparity in arrests is something the 
law should seek to avoid. 
When Justice Rehnquist suggested thirty-five years ago in Texas 
v. Brown that probable cause to arrest an individual or search one’s 
property need not be correct or even more likely than not, he 
significantly lowered the bar for probable cause. Probable cause 
should be more robust for the protection of all civilians. Lower 
courts should reject the definition of probable cause from Texas v. 
Brown. Rather than follow Justice Rehnquist’s view that probable 
cause does not require more than fifty percent certainty, judicial 
officers deciding whether there is probable cause to arrest an 
individual should insist on a more robust showing. At least in most 
cases, before an officer can execute a custodial arrest, he or she 
should have more than a fifty-fifty certainty that the individual has 
committed the offense for which she or he is being arrested. If 
probable cause turns on probabilities, as the Supreme Court has 
often stated, it ought to mean that it is at least probable, i.e., more 
likely than not, that a crime has been committed and that the 
individual being arrested committed that crime. 
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I 
 
The Supreme Court’s Modern Jurisprudence on Probable 
Cause 
 
A. Incapable of Precise Definition  
 
In many respects, the Supreme Court has not provided much 
guidance on the meaning of probable cause. Indeed, it has stated that 
“[a]rticulating precisely what . . . ‘probable cause’ mean[s] is not 
possible.”30 According to the Court, “The probable cause standard 
is incapable of precise definition or quantification into percentages 
because it deals with probabilities and depends on the totality of the 
circumstances.”31 According to the Court, probable cause “is a fluid 
concept—turning on the assessment of probabilities in particular 
factual contexts—not readily, or even usefully, reduced to a neat set 
of legal rules.”32 Along these lines, the Court has stated, “probable 
cause is a flexible, common-sense standard.”33  
One problem with these pronouncements is that they offer very 
little guidance to courts and police officers in practice. As Ronald 
Bacigal notes, “[t]he inability to formulate clear rules or precise 
probability levels governing probable cause has [led] the Court to 
adopt one over-arching rule for the police—just use your common 
sense and act reasonably.”34 What constitutes acting reasonably, 
however, is subjective. What may seem reasonable to one person 
may seem completely unreasonable to another.35  
                                                             
30 Ornelas v. United States, 517 U.S. 690, 695 (1996). 
31 Maryland v. Pringle, 540 U.S. 366, 371 (2003) (emphasis added). 
32 Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 232 (1983) (emphasis added). 
33 Texas v. Brown, 460 U.S. 730, 742 (1983). 
34 Ronald J. Bacigal, Making the Right Gamble: The Odds on Probable Cause, 74 
MISS. L.J. 279, 318 (2004). 
35 As Justice Thurgood Marshall noted in objecting to the standard of 
reasonableness for establishing a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel 
adopted by the majority in Strickland v. Washington, “To tell lawyers and the 
lower courts that counsel for a criminal defendant must behave ‘reasonably’ and 
must act like ‘a reasonably competent attorney,’ is to tell them almost nothing.” 
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, ___ (1984) (Marshall, J., dissenting). See 
also  Cynthia Lee, Reforming the Law on Police Use of Deadly Force: De-
Escalation, Preseizure Conduct, and Imperfect Self-Defense, 218 U. ILL. L. REV. 
629, 655 (noting that reasonableness in the context of assessing a police officer’s 
use of force “is such an open-ended standard; alone, it provides little-to-no 
guidance to the jury”); Dan Kahan et al., Whose Eyes Are You Going to Believe? 
Scott v. Harris and the Perils of Cognitive Illiberalism, 122 HARV. L. REV. 837 
(2009) (finding that 1,350 Americans who viewed a dashcam videotape of a high-
speed police chase that ended with the officer ramming his patrol car into the 
Respondent’s car, rendering him a quadriplegic, disagreed over whether the 
officer's use of force was reasonable and that their disagreements tracked their 
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Somewhat more definitively, the Court has explained that 
“[p]robable cause exists where ‘the facts and circumstances within 
their [the officers’] knowledge and of which they had reasonably 
trustworthy information [are] sufficient in themselves to warrant a 
man of reasonable caution in the belief that’ an offense has been or 
is being committed.”36 The Court has also said that “‘[t]he substance 
of all the definitions’ of probable cause is a reasonable ground for 
belief of guilt.”37 Moreover, “this belief of guilt must be 
particularized with respect to the person to be searched or seized.”38 
In other words, probable cause to arrest an individual requires a 
reasonable ground for believing that an offense has been or is being 
committed and that a particular person—the person being arrested—
is responsible for committing that offense. Just how much certainty 
is sufficient to constitute “a reasonable ground” that a crime has 
been committed and that the person to be arrested committed that 
crime, however, is not so clear. It just needs to be somewhere 
between more than a mere suspicion and less than proof necessary 
to convict.39 
 
B. Deference to the Government 
 
Not only has the Supreme Court provided a very mushy 
definition of probable cause that appears to require not much in the 
way of certainty, but also, on almost every single question involving 
probable cause, the Court has ruled in favor of the government rather 
than the defendant. Cases in which the Court has deferred to the 
government on issues involving probable cause include (1) 
                                                             
overall cultural values with individuals valuing individualism and hierarchy 
tending to see the officer’s use of force as reasonable and those favoring 
communitarian values tending to see the officer’s use of force as unreasonable); 
CYNTHIA LEE, MURDER AND THE REASONABLE MAN PASSION AND FEAR IN THE 
CRIMINAL COURTROOM 154 (NYU Press 2003) (using the Bernhard Goetz case 
to show how reasonable people can disagree about whether a defendant acted 
reasonably in self-defense, noting that the predominantly white jury that acquitted 
Bernhard Goetz, a Caucasian man who shot at four black youths on a New York 
subway in 1984 after two of them approached him and asked him for $5, of all the 
charges against him except illegal possession of a firearm “obviously felt he acted 
reasonably when he shot the youths in response to a request for money” but nine 
years later, “an all-minority six-person civil jury, composed of four blacks and 
two Hispanics, [rejected his claim of self-defense and] found Goetz liable to 
Darryl Cabey, the boy who was paralyzed after Goetz shot him in the spine, and 
ordered him to pay Cabey $43 million in damages”). 
36 Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 175–76 (1949). 
37 Id. 
38 Maryland v. Pringle, 540 U.S. 366, 695 (2003). 
39 Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 175 (1949) (noting that probable cause 
“means less than evidence which would justify condemnation” but “more than 
bare suspicion”). 
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situations where the policer officer did not have probable cause as 
to the crime of arrest, but where a court found post-hoc probable 
cause for some other offense, (2) probable cause based on informant 
tips, (3) probable cause established by dog sniffs, and (4) probable 
cause based on a common enterprise theory between occupants of a 
car in which drugs were found. 
 
1.  Wrong Crime or Wrong Person, No Problem 
 
The Court has held that if police arrest an individual for a crime 
for which they lacked probable cause to arrest, that arrest 
nonetheless is valid if police had probable cause to arrest the 
individual for a different crime.40 In Devenpeck v. Alford, police 
arrested a man named Jerome Alford for recording his conversations 
with them during a traffic stop.41 Alford was taken to jail where he 
was charged with violating the State Privacy Act.42 However, 
Alford’s recording of his conversation with the officers was not a 
crime under the State Privacy Act.43 Accordingly, a state trial court 
dismissed the charge because the officers were wrong in thinking 
that secretly recording a conversation with a police officer violated 
the State Privacy Act.44  
Alford sued the officers for unlawful arrest and false 
imprisonment, alleging that the officers arrested him without 
probable cause in violation of the Fourth Amendment and the 
Fourteenth Amendment.45 Even though it was clear that the officers 
lacked probable cause to arrest Alford for recording his conversation 
with them, the jury found in favor of the officers after being 
instructed that for respondent to prevail on either his federal or state 
law claim, he had to demonstrate that petitioners arrested him 
without probable cause, and that probable cause exists “if the facts 
and circumstances within the arresting officer's knowledge are 
sufficient to warrant a prudent person to conclude that the suspect 
has committed, is committing, or was about to commit a crime.”46  
The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed on the ground that 
the officers could not have had probable cause to arrest Alford for 
violating the State Privacy Act because “[t]ape recording officers 
                                                             
40 Devenpeck v. Alford, 543 U.S. 149, 125 S. Ct. 588 (2004). 
41 Id. at 592. [need to replace with pincite to 543 U.S. 149 rather than 125 S. 
Ct. 588] 
42 Id.  
43 Id. at 593. [need to replace with pincite to 543 U.S. 149 rather than 125 S. 
Ct. 588] 
44 Id.  
45 Id. at 592. [need to replace with pincite to 543 U.S. 149 rather than 125 S. 
Ct. 588] 
46 Id. at 151.  
 
11 PROBABLE CAUSE WITH TEETH [August-15-19] 
 
 
 
conducting a traffic stop is not a crime in the state of Washington.”47  
The Court of Appeals rejected the officers’ claim that the arrest of 
Alford was valid since they had probable cause to arrest Alford for 
other crimes, namely impersonating a law enforcement officer and 
obstructing a law enforcement officer, because these other crimes 
were not closely related to the offense for which Alford was actually 
arrested.48 
The Supreme Court reversed the Ninth Circuit, noting that a 
“warrantless arrest by a law officer is reasonable under the Fourth 
Amendment where there is probable cause to believe a criminal 
offense has been or is being committed.”49 The Court explained that 
the probable cause inquiry is an objective inquiry and that the 
“arresting officer’s state of mind (except for the facts that he knows) 
is irrelevant to the existence of probable cause.”50 In short, the Court 
agreed with the government’s position that if a court (or jury) 
decides after the fact that there was probable cause to arrest the 
defendant for a crime other than the crime of arrest, the arrest will 
be valid even if the arresting officer did not realize at the time that 
he had probable cause to arrest for the other offense. 
Additionally, the Court has held that if police have probable 
cause to arrest one person (A) for a crime and they arrest the wrong 
person (B), mistakenly but reasonably believing that B is A, their 
arrest of B is valid.51 It has also held that probable cause to arrest or 
search can be based on evidence that would be inadmissible at 
trial.52 
 
2.  Informant Tips  
 
Another example of the Court favoring the government over the 
defendant is reflected in its treatment of probable cause in the 
informant context. Initially, the Court applied a two-prong test for 
probable cause in cases where police were relying in part or in whole 
on an informant’s tip to establish probable cause. Under the Aguilar-
Spinelli test,53 the government had to establish (1) the informant’s 
basis of knowledge or “the particular means by which [the 
                                                             
47 Id. 
48 Id. 
49 Id. 
50 Id. 
51 Hill v. California, 401 U.S. 797, 802 (1971).   
52 Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 173 (1949) (finding that evidence 
excluded at trial was properly admitted at the suppression hearing where the issue 
was whether the officer had probable cause to search). 
53 Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108 (1964); Spinelli v. United States, 393 U.S. 410 
(1969). 
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informant] came by the information given in his report,”54 and (2) 
the informant’s veracity.55 In other words, the government had to 
show why the informant was credible or why the information the 
informant had provided to police was trustworthy or reliable.56 
In 1983, the Court in Illinois v. Gates did a complete about-face, 
abandoning the Aguilar-Spinelli test in favor of a “totality of the 
circumstances” test for determining probable cause in informant 
cases.57 Writing for the Court, Justice Rehnquist acknowledged that 
an informant’s veracity, reliability and basis of knowledge were all 
“highly relevant in determining the value of his report,”58 but noted 
that these factors should not be “understood as entirely separate and 
independent requirements to be rigidly exacted in every case.”59 
Instead, basis of knowledge and veracity “should be understood 
simply as closely intertwined issues that may usefully illuminate the 
commonsense, practical question whether there is ‘probable cause’ 
. . . .”60  
In support of the Court’s decision to abandon the Aguilar-
Spinelli test,61 Justice Rehnquist explained that “probable cause is a 
fluid concept—turning on the assessment of probabilities in 
                                                             
54 Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 228 (1983) (describing the basis of knowledge 
prong in the two-pronged Aguilar-Spinelli test). See also Aguilar v. Texas, 378 
U.S. 108, 114 (1964) (“the magistrate must be informed of some of the underlying 
circumstances from which the informant concluded that the narcotics were where 
he claimed they were”). 
55 Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213. The Court in Gates notes that an informant’s 
“veracity” is an important factor in determining the weight of an informant’s tip, 
without defining the term. The term “veracity” generally refers to a person’s 
truthfulness. See, e.g., United States v. Abel, 469 U.S. 45, 55 (1984) (referring to 
veracity as “character for truthfulness or untruthfulness” in the context of Federal 
Rule of Evidence 608); veracity, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014) 
(defining “veracity” as “habitual regard for and observance of the truth; truthful 
nature” and “[c]onsistency with the truth; accuracy”). 
56 See Spinelli v. United States, 393 U.S. 410, 415 (1969) (“[The magistrate] must 
ask: Can it fairly be said that the tip, even when certain parts of it have been 
corroborated by independent sources, is as trustworthy as a tip which would pass 
Aguilar's tests without independent corroboration?”). 
57 Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 230 (1983). Previously, the Spinelli Court had 
expressly rejected a totality of the circumstances approach. See Spinelli, 393 U.S. 
at 415 (“We believe . . . that the ‘totality of circumstances’ approach taken by the 
Court of Appeals paints with too broad a brush. Where, as here, the informer’s tip 
is a necessary element in a finding of probable cause, its proper weight must be 
determined by a more precise analysis.”). For a defense of the Illinois v. Gates 
decision, see Joseph D. Grano, Probable Cause and Common Sense: A Reply to 
the Critics of Illinois v. Gates, 17 J. L. REFORM 465 (1984) (arguing that the Court 
in Illinois v. Gates correctly abandoned the Aguilar-Spinelli two-pronged test). 
58 Id.  
59 Id. 
60 Id. 
61 Id. at 238 (“we conclude that it is wiser to abandon the ‘two-pronged test’ 
established by our decisions in Aguilar and Spinelli”). 
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particular factual contexts—not readily, or even usefully, reduced to 
a neat set of legal rules.”62 While Illinois v. Gates was a case about 
probable cause in the informant context, its language about probable 
cause being a fluid concept not readily reducible to bright line rules 
has been repeated in many other cases not involving informant 
tips.63 
Justice Rehnquist provided a list of examples of cases where the 
government could prevail in establishing probable cause under its 
new totality of the circumstances test where it would not have 
prevailed under the Aguilar-Spinelli test. “If, for example, a 
particular informant is known for the unusual reliability of his 
predictions of certain types of criminal activities in a locality, his 
failure, in a particular case, to thoroughly set forth the basis of his 
knowledge surely should not serve as an absolute bar to a finding of 
probable cause based on his tip.”64 Justice Rehnquist continued, 
“Likewise, if an unquestionably honest citizen comes forward with 
a report of criminal activity—which if fabricated would subject him 
to criminal liability—we have found rigorous scrutiny of the basis 
of his knowledge unnecessary.”65  
One problem with not requiring a showing of both basis of 
knowledge and veracity is that an unquestionably honest citizen, 
strong on the veracity prong, without any basis of knowledge can be 
badly mistaken. For example, on September 12, 2002,66 
approximately one year after the attacks on the World Trade Center 
and Pentagon that took place on September 11, 2001, 67 an 
unquestionably honest citizen named Eunice Stone reported to 
police a conversation she overheard and found very disturbing when 
                                                             
62 Id. at 232. 
63 See, e.g., United States v. Carroll, 750 F.3d 700, 703 (7th Cir. 2014); United 
States v. Colbert, 605 F.3d 573, 576 (8th Cir. 2010); Brown v. City of New York, 
201 F. Supp. 3d 328, 331 (E.D.N.Y. 2016); United States v. Valentine, 517 F. 
Supp. 2d 816, 820 (W.D. Va. 2007). 
64 Id. at 233. 
65 Id. at 233-34. 
66 See David M. Halbfinger, Terror Scare In Florida: False Alarm, But Televised, 
N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 14, 2002), https://www.nytimes.com/2002/09/14/us/terror-
scare-in-florida-false-alarm-but-televised.html. 
67 On September 11, 2001, terrorists flew planes into the World Trade Center in 
New York City and the Pentagon in Northern Virginia. See James Barron, 
Thousands Feared Dead as World Trade Center Is Toppled, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 
11, 2001), https://www.nytimes.com/2001/09/11/national/thousands-feared-
dead-as-world-trade-center-is-toppled.html. Another plane crashed in 
Pennsylvania. See id. More than 2,997 people died as a result of the 9/11 attacks. 
See Aaron Katersky, The 9/11 toll still grows: More than 16,000 Ground Zero 
responders who got sick found eligible for awards, ABC NEWS (Sept. 10, 2018, 
5:35 AM), https://abcnews.go.com/beta-story-container/US/911-toll-growsl-
16000-ground-responders-sick-found/story?id=57669657. 
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eating at a Shoney’s restaurant in Calhoun, Georgia.68 According to 
Stone, three men who appeared to be of Middle Eastern descent 
were laughing and joking about what happened on September 11, 
2001. Stone told police one of the men said, “If they mourn 
September 11, what will they think about September 13?”69 and 
another spoke about “bringing down” something.70 Stone also 
claimed the men were speaking in a foreign language like Arabic.71  
Stone grabbed a crayon, followed the men when they left the 
restaurant, wrote down the license plate numbers of their cars, and 
then called the Georgia State Patrol to report what she heard.72 
Police caught up with the men just outside of Naples, Florida.73 The 
men were arrested, handcuffed, then detained for more than 
seventeen hours while police searched their cars, finding nothing 
indicating a plot to commit a terroristic act against the United 
States.74  
It turns out the three men Stone thought were terrorists were 
actually medical students on their way to Larkin Community 
Hospital in South Miami, where they were hoping to begin a series 
of nine-week rotations.75 Their entire conversation was in English, 
not Arabic, since only one of the men knew a bit of Arabic.76 While 
all three men were of Middle Eastern descent,77 they all were legally 
in the United States, and two of the three men were U.S. citizens.78 
“Bringing down” something referred to a car that one of the students 
                                                             
68 See Vikram Amar, The Golden Rule of Racial Profiling, L.A. TIMES (Sept. 22, 
2002), http://articles.latimes.com/2002/sep/22/opinion/op-amar22 (“Stone, by all 
accounts, had no incentive to victimize the men. More generally, she does not 
seem like the kind of person to purposefully lie to the police.”). See also 
Halbfinger, supra note 66 (noting that Stone overheard this conversation while 
dining at a Shoney’s restaurant in Calhoun, Georgia). 
69 See Halbfinger, supra note 66. 
70 Amar, supra note 68. 
71 See Terror scare men: ‘We want our dignity back’, CNN (Sept. 17, 2002, 9:19 
AM), http://edition.cnn.com/2002/US/09/17/fla.students.talk/index.html. 
72 See Halbfinger, supra note 66. 
73 See id. 
74 See id.; see also Press Release, American-Arab Anti-Discrimination 
Committee, ADC Calls for Thorough Investigation of Terror False Alarm in 
Florida (Sept. 17, 2002), http://www.adc.org/adc-calls-for-thorough-
investigation-of-terror-false-alarm-in-florida/ (expressing serious concern about 
the circumstances leading to the arrest and seventeen hour detention of three 
medical students heading to Larkin Community Hospital in South Miami to begin 
training and noting that the men believed Eunice Stone’s concerns were prompted 
by their Middle Eastern and Muslim appearance) 
75  Halbfinger, supra note 66. 
76 Terror scare men, supra note 71 (noting that the medical students told CNN 
that only one of them understands and speaks Arabic). 
77 See Halbfinger, supra note 66. 
78 Amar, supra note 68; Halbfinger, supra note 66. 
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wanted to bring down to Miami.79 Even though the police finally 
released the men from police custody, the hospital decided to revoke 
their internships because of the controversy over the reported 
conversation they had at the Shoney’s restaurant.80 
Under the Illinois v. Gates test, a strong showing on one prong 
can make up for a weak showing on the other prong. In this case, if 
a court had to assess whether the government had the requisite 
probable cause to arrest the men, the government could make a 
strong showing on the veracity prong since they had a witness who 
appeared of unquestionable honesty with no apparent motive to lie 
about what she heard. The problem was that the witness had no basis 
for knowing what she claimed to know. She was not a friend or 
colleague of the three men with intimate knowledge of their plans. 
She had not observed the men engaging in any criminal activity. She 
had simply overheard a conversation that she mistakenly thought 
was a plot to commit a terrorist act. According to Illinois v. Gates, 
the government’s very weak showing of basis of knowledge could 
be overcome by its strong showing on the veracity front. 
In explaining how to apply the new totality of circumstances 
approach to probable cause, Justice Rehnquist also emphasized that 
it was unnecessary for judicial officers to find an informant’s 
information trustworthy or the informant credible as long as the 
informant gives a lot of detail and claims the information is based 
on first-hand knowledge: “[E]ven if we entertain some doubt as to 
an informant’s motives, his explicit and detailed description of 
alleged wrongdoing, along with a statement that the event was 
observed firsthand, entitles his tip to greater weight than might 
otherwise be the case.”81  
In his dissent, Justice Brennan provided a hypothetical, posed 
originally by Justice White, concurring in Spinelli v. United States, 
illustrating how a tipster might give police a lot of detail and claim 
first-hand knowledge that person is involved in criminal activity, but 
it would not be wise to find probable cause to believe there was 
evidence of a crime in the place in question: 
 
[Suppose] a reliable informant states there is gambling 
equipment in Apartment 607 and then proceeds to describe in 
detail Apartment 201, a description which is verified before 
applying for the warrant. He was right about 201, but that hardly 
makes him more believable about the equipment in 607. But 
                                                             
79 Amar, supra note 68. See also Terror scare men, supra note 71 (noting that one 
of the medical students told CNN that he was the only one of the three that hadn’t 
yet purchased a car, “[s]o the plan was that once we get to Miami I would buy a 
car before classes started, and I said that in case I don’t find one in Miami, I could 
have one shipped down from Kansas City”). 
80 See Terror scare men, supra note 71. 
81 Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 234 (1983). 
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what if he states that there are narcotics locked in a safe in 
Apartment 300, which is described in detail, and the apartment 
manager verifies everything but the contents of the safe? I doubt 
that the report about the narcotics is made appreciably more 
believable by the verification. The informant could still have 
gotten his information concerning the safe from others about 
whom nothing is known or could have inferred the presence of 
narcotics from circumstances which a magistrate would find 
unacceptable.82 
 
Hypotheticals aside, a person with an axe to grind or grudge can 
provide false details to police in order to harass another person. For 
example, in September 2012, Kenny Smith called police and falsely 
told them that a man named Christopher Shell was on a particular 
U.S. Airways flight from Philadelphia to Dallas-Fort Worth 
international Airport and had liquid explosives with him.83 Based on 
this tip, police asked the pilot of that flight to bring the plane down.84  
Shell “was on his way to Dallas to celebrate his 29th birthday on 
Thursday when his US Airways flight was turned around and forced 
to return to Philadelphia.”85 Shell was taken off the plane at gunpoint 
and detained while the plane and his luggage were searched.86  No 
                                                             
82 Id. at 282 (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
83 Christina Ng & Richard Esposito, Plane Bomb Hoax to “Avenge” 
Compromising Photos, Cops Say, ABC NEWS (Sept. 7, 2012, 10:58 AM), 
https://abcnews.go.com/US/plane-bomb-hoax-avenge-compromising-facebook-
photos-cops/story?id=17182136#.UFtQbK45iko [https://perma.cc/5RXS-
USLC]; see also Tim Jimenez, Diana Rocco & Elizabeth Hur, Philadelphia Man 
Charged With Fake Report Of Bomb Aboard Airliner, CBS PHILADELPHIA (Sept. 
7, 2012, 8:09 PM), https://philadelphia.cbslocal.com/2012/09/07/philadelphia-
man-charged-with-fake-report-of-bomb-aboard-airliner/ (reporting that Smith 
called in the tip from a payphone using the name “George Michaels”); Victim of 
Philadelphia plan explosives hoax later arrested in Texas, FOX NEWS (last 
updated Nov. 29, 2015), https://www.foxnews.com/us/victim-of-philadelphia-
plane-explosives-hoax-later-arrested-in-texas (reporting that police at 
Philadelphia International Airport received the call around 7:30 AM, and later 
turned the investigation over to the FBI); Richard Esposito & Christina Ng, 
Police: Angry Ex-Girlfriend Triggered US Airways Bomb Hoax, ABC NEWS 
(Sept. 6, 2012, 9:53 AM), https://abcnews.go.com/US/police-angry-girlfriend-
triggered-us-airways-bomb-hoax/story?id=17170280 (reporting that Shell had 
“been sped through security by a friend at the airport” and had posted to Facebook 
that “getting through security had been a breeze,” which caught the FBI’s 
attention and led to “bomb techs, cops, FBI agents and K-9 dogs descend[ing] on 
the plane and conduct[ing] a full search”).  
84 Ng & Esposito, Plane Bomb Hoax to “Avenge” Compromising Photos, supra 
note 83. 
85 Id. 
86 Id.; see also Esposito & Ng, Police: Angry Ex-Girlfriend Triggered US Airways 
Bomb Hoax, supra note 83 (reporting that Shell was questioned, and both his 
luggage and the plane were searched, but no explosives were found).  
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explosives were found either on the plane, in Shell’s luggage, or on 
Shell himself.87 After being searched and interrogated, Shell was 
released.88  Police later discovered that Smith had called in the tip 
because he was angry at Shell for posting photos of his (Smith’s) 
girlfriend (who was Shell’s ex-girlfriend) on Facebook.89 While 
police certainly had sufficient justification to take Shell off the plane 
and temporarily detain him while they searched him and his luggage 
to confirm whether the tipster’s information was correct,90 arresting 
Shell—a man who was not carrying liquid explosives on the plane 
but was simply trying to take a flight to Dallas to celebrate his 
birthday—would not have been appropriate.91 Yet under the totality 
of the circumstances test announced in Illinois v. Gates, a court 
could conclude that police had probable cause to arrest Shell since 
the caller had provided police with details of alleged wrongdoing 
and claimed first-hand knowledge that Shell was carrying liquid 
explosives on the plane. 
 
3. Dog Sniffs  
 
The Supreme Court’s jurisprudence on dog sniffs in the Fourth 
Amendment context is another example of the Court favoring the 
government over the defendant. In Florida v. Harris,92 the issue 
before the Court was whether an alert by a drug detection dog during 
a traffic stop establishes probable cause to search a vehicle.93 The 
Florida Supreme Court had held that the officer lacked probable 
                                                             
87 Ng & Esposito, Plane Bomb Hoax to “Avenge” Compromising Photos, supra 
note 83. 
88 Id. 
89 Id. Smith was arrested and charged with conveying false and misleading 
information to police. Id. 
90 See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 33 (1968) (Harlan, J., concurring) (noting that 
as a general matter, police must have constitutional grounds, i.e., reasonable 
suspicion of criminal activity, to forcibly stop an individual before they can frisk 
the individual upon reasonable suspicion that the individual is armed and 
dangerous, but that “the right to frisk must be immediate and automatic if the 
reason for the stop is . . .  an articulable suspicion of a crime of violence”).  
91 While declining to set forth a bright-line test for delineating between temporary 
detentions of the persons for which reasonable suspicion is all that is required and 
de facto arrests for which probable cause is required, the Supreme Court has held 
that a de facto arrest can take place even if police do not formally place an 
individual under arrest. Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 503, 495 (1983) (finding 
that defendant Royer was arrested before he was formally placed under arrest even 
though only 15 minutes had elapsed between from the time the detectives initially 
approached respondent until his arrest upon the discovery of the contraband). 
Accordingly, even if Shell was not formally placed under arrest, being handcuffed 
and led off the plane at gunpoint, then detained while the plane and his luggage 
were searched, may have constituted a de facto arrest. 
92 Florida v. Harris, 133 S. Ct. 1050 (2013). 
93 Id. at 1053. 
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cause to search the defendant’s vehicle in large part because the 
State failed to establish that the dog in question was reliable. The 
Florida Supreme Court explained that in order to establish probable 
cause when relying on a drug detection dog’s alert, “[t]he State must 
present . . . the dog’s training and certification records, an 
explanation of the meaning of the particular training and 
certification, field performance records (including any unverified 
alerts), and evidence concerning the experience and training of the 
officer handling the dog, as well as any other objective evidence 
known to the officer about the dog’s reliability.”94  
The Supreme Court reversed, rejecting the Florida Supreme 
Court’s ruling that the State had failed to establish probable cause, 
explaining that “[t]he test for probable cause is not reducible to 
‘precise definition or quantification.’”95 “All we have required [for 
probable cause] is the kind of ‘fair probability’ on which ‘reasonable 
and prudent [people], not legal technicians, act.”96 The Court 
explained that in evaluating probable cause, “we have consistently 
looked to the totality of the circumstances” and “have rejected rigid 
rules, bright-line tests, and mechanistic inquiries in favor of a more 
flexible, all-things-considered approach.”97 In listing the types of 
evidence the State had to produce in order to establish probable 
cause in the dog sniff context, the Florida Supreme Court had, in the 
Supreme Court’s view, imposed an overly rigid rule, making it too 
difficult for the State to establish probable cause. As it had done in 
Illinois v. Gates, the Court eschewed bright line rules that would 
have required the government to provide objective evidence of 
reliability in favor of a less precise standard of probable cause that 
would allow the trial court to find in favor of the government 
whenever it was inclined to do so. 
 
4. Cars as Places Where Occupants Engage In Common 
Criminal Enterprises 
 
Another example of the Supreme Court favoring the government 
in a decision involving probable cause can be found in Maryland v. 
Pringle, in which the Court held that an officer who lawfully stops 
and searches a car with three occupants, finding drugs and money 
within, has probable cause to arrest all three occupants of the vehicle 
for possession of the drugs if all three occupants refuse to admit 
ownership of the drugs.98 In Pringle, an officer stopped a car for 
                                                             
94 Id. at 1055. 
95 Id. 
96 Id. 
97 Id. at 1055–56. 
98 Maryland v. Pringle, 540 U.S. 370, 372 (2003). 
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speeding around 3:16 a.m.99 The officer saw that there were three 
men in the car: the driver, a front-seat passenger, and a back-seat 
passenger.100 The officer asked for and received consent from the 
driver to search the vehicle.101 Upon searching the car, the officer 
found $763 in the glove compartment and five plastic baggies 
containing cocaine hidden behind the backseat armrest.102 The 
officer asked the three men who owned the drugs and money and 
told them that if no one admitted to ownership of the drugs, he was 
going to arrest them all.103 None of the men admitted to owning the 
cash or drugs, so the officer arrested all three men and transported 
them to the police station.104 Later that morning, Pringle, the front-
seat passenger, admitted that the cocaine belonged to him and that 
he intended to sell the cocaine or use it for sex.105 Pringle told police 
that the two others in the car did not know about the drugs and they 
were released.106  
Before his trial for possession of cocaine with intent to 
distribute, Pringle moved to suppress his confession as the fruit of 
an illegal arrest. The trial court denied Pringle’s motion, finding that 
the officer had probable cause to arrest Pringle.107 Pringle was 
convicted of possession of cocaine with intent to distribute, and 
sentenced to ten years in prison.108 The Court of Appeals of 
Maryland reversed Pringle’s conviction, holding that the mere 
finding of cocaine in the backseat armrest of a car was insufficient 
to establish probable cause to arrest the front seat passenger of a car 
for possession of cocaine given that there was also someone in the 
driver’s seat and another person in the backseat at the time of the 
arrest.109  
The Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals of Maryland. 
Writing for a unanimous Court, Justice Rehnquist noted that it was 
uncontested that upon finding the five glassine baggies, the officer 
had probable cause to believe a felony had been committed and 
                                                             
99 Id. at 368. 
100 Id. 
101 Id. 
102 Id. 
103 Id. 
104 Id. at 368–69. 
105 Id. at 369. 
106 Id.  
107 Id. 
108 Id.  
109 Pringle v. State, 805 A.2d 1016, 1027 (Md. 2002) (“Without additional facts 
available to the officer at that time that would tend to establish petitioner's 
knowledge and dominion or control over the drugs, the mere finding of cocaine 
in the back armrest when petitioner was a front seat passenger in a car being driven 
by its owner is insufficient to establish probable cause for an arrest for 
possession.”). 
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therefore the sole question before the Court was whether the officer 
had probable cause to believe Pringle had committed that crime.110 
After repeating what the Court had said before about probable cause 
being “a fluid concept . . . not readily, or even usefully, reduced to a 
neat set of legal rules”111 and “incapable of precise definition or 
quantification into percentages because it deals with probabilities 
and depends on the totality of the circumstances,”112 but not the not 
more likely than not language from his plurality opinion in Texas v. 
Brown, Justice Rehnquist noted: 
 
In this case, Pringle was one of three men riding in a Nissan 
Maxima at 3:16 a.m. There was $763 of rolled-up cash in the 
glove compartment directly in front of Pringle. Five plastic 
glassine baggies of cocaine were behind the back-seat armrest 
and accessible to all three men. Upon questioning, the three men 
failed to offer any information with respect to the ownership of 
the cocaine or the money.113 
 
In light of these facts, Justice Rehnquist concluded: 
 
We think it an entirely reasonable inference from these facts that 
any or all three of the occupants had knowledge of, and 
exercised dominion and control over, the cocaine. Thus, a 
reasonable officer could conclude there was probable cause to 
believe Pringle committed the crime of possession of cocaine, 
either solely or jointly.114   
 
Rejecting Pringle’s argument that it was improper to suggest 
probable cause existed from the mere fact that he was found in a car 
with drugs, Justice Rehnquist opined that “a car passenger . . . will 
often be engaged in a common enterprise with the driver, and have 
the same interest in concealing the fruits or the evidence of their 
wrongdoing.”115 Justice Rehnquist continued: 
 
Here we think it was reasonable for the officer to infer a common 
enterprise among the three men. The quantity of the drugs and 
cash in the car indicated the likelihood of drug dealing, an 
enterprise to which a dealer would be unlikely to admit an 
innocent person with the potential to furnish evidence against 
him.116 
                                                             
110 Pringle, 540 U.S. at 370. 
111 Id. at 370–71. 
112 Id. at 371. 
113 Id. at 371–72. 
114 Id. at 372. 
115 Id. at 373, citing Wyoming v. Houghton, 526 U.S. 295 (1999). 
116 Id. 
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Even though the Court could have easily concluded that it was 
more likely that the drugs found in the backseat armrest belonged 
either to the driver of the car or to the passenger in the backseat, the 
Court found there was probable cause to arrest Pringle as well as the 
driver and the backseat passenger because occupants of a car found 
with drugs within are likely to be involved in a common criminal 
enterprise.117 
 
C. Open Questions 
 
As the foregoing discussion indicates, the Supreme Court has 
said a great deal about probable cause. Nonetheless, the Court has 
left unanswered a few questions. For example, the Court has never 
clearly decided whether probable cause to arrest requires probable 
cause on each and every element of the offense of arrest. 
Additionally, it has never clearly decided whether the amount of 
certainty required for a finding of probable cause should vary 
depending upon the gravity of the offense. 
 
 
1. Whether Probable Cause to Arrest Requires Probable Cause 
on Each and Every Element of the Offense of Arrest 
 
One question that remains open even though the Supreme Court 
seems inclined to decide this question in a defendant-friendly 
manner is whether probable cause to arrest requires probable cause 
for each and every element of the arrest offense.118 In District of 
Columbia v. Wesby, twenty-one people who were attending a party 
at a house that did not belong to the person who invited them were 
arrested for unlawful entry, i.e., trespass.119 One argument advanced 
by sixteen of the partygoers who challenged their arrest 
(Respondents) was that the police needed probable cause on each 
and every element of the offense of arrest.120 Respondents argued 
the police did not have reasonable grounds to believe they knew or 
had reason to know that they were there without permission, and that 
                                                             
117 Id. 
118 Corbin Houston, Note, Probable Cause Means Probable Cause: Why the 
Circuit Courts Should Uniformly Require Officers to Establish Probable Cause 
for Every Element of an Offense, 2016 U. CHI. L. FORUM 809, 813 (noting that the 
Supreme Court has not yet addressed whether probable cause must be proven for 
every element of the offense of arrest and that the lower courts are split over this 
question). 
119 District of Columbia v. Wesby, 138 S. Ct. 577 (2018). 
120 Initial Brief of Appellee-Respondent, District of Columbia et al v. Wesby, 
2017 U.S. S. Ct. Briefs LEXIS 2419, *10-11 (July 12, 2017). 
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without probable cause on the mens rea element of unlawful entry, 
the police lacked probable cause to arrest the partygoers for 
unlawful entry.121  
Without explicitly taking a position on this issue, the Court 
appeared to accept Respondents’ claim that to establish probable 
cause, the government had to show that the police officers had 
probable cause on each and every element of the offense of arrest 
since the Court spent the bulk of its opinion explaining why the 
officers had good reason to believe that the partygoers knew or had 
reason to know that they were at the house without the owner’s 
permission.122 
 
2. Whether the Court Should Adopt a Sliding Scale or 
Fluctuating Standard of Probable Cause? 
 
Another question that the Court has not yet addressed is whether 
the quantum of evidence or certainty needed for a finding of 
probable cause should vary depending upon the gravity of the 
offense at issue. In other words, if the offense in question is a very 
serious offense, should police be able to make a showing of probable 
cause on less proof than would be necessary if the offense in 
question were not as grave an offense?  
The closest the Court has come to addressing this issue came in 
a case involving the question of whether police had reasonable 
suspicion to stop and frisk a young black man standing at a bus stop, 
not a case in which the issue was whether the police had probable 
cause to support an arrest. Reasonable suspicion of criminal activity 
is what is needed for police to conduct a stop or a brief, temporary 
detention of a person.123 Reasonable suspicion requires less 
certainty than probable cause to arrest.124 
In Florida v. J.L, police received an anonymous tip that a young 
black male standing at a particular bus stop, wearing a plaid shirt, 
was carrying a handgun. 125 Based on the tip, the police went to the 
bus stop in question where they saw three black males, one of whom 
was in a plaid shirt.126 One of the officers went up to J.L., the male 
                                                             
121 Id. at *19–20. 
122 District of Columbia v. Wesby, 138 S. Ct. 577 (2018). 
123 Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 30 (1968). 
124 See United States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1, 7 (1989) (reasoning that “the level 
of suspicion for a Terry stop is obviously less demanding than that for probable 
cause”); United States v. Montoya de Hernandez, 473 U.S. 531, 541 (1985) 
(stating that the reasonable suspicion standard applies “when law enforcement 
officials must make a limited intrusion on less than probable cause”).  
125 Florida v. J.L., 529 U.S. 266 (2000). 
126 Id. at 268. 
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in the plaid shirt, told him to put his hands up on the bus stop, frisked 
him, and found a gun in his pocket.127  
J.L., who was fifteen years old at the time, was charged with 
carrying a concealed firearm without a license and possessing a 
firearm while under the age of eighteen.128 He moved to suppress 
the gun as the product of an unlawful search.129 The trial court 
granted his motion, the intermediate court of appeals reversed, and 
the Florida Supreme Court overruled the intermediate court of 
appeals, holding the search invalid under the Fourth Amendment.130 
The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the officers lacked a 
reasonable suspicion to justify the stop and frisk.131 The Court felt it 
was particularly significant that the anonymous tip in this case 
contained only identifying information but no predictive 
information, i.e., information about future movements of third 
parties.132  
Writing for the Court, Justice Ginsburg left open the possibility 
that the Court might allow a finding of reasonable suspicion on 
similar facts if the crime in question were a more serious offense 
than illegal possession of a firearm, stating, “We do not say, for 
example, that a report of a person carrying a bomb need bear the 
indicia of reliability we demand for a report of a person carrying a 
firearm before the police can constitutionally conduct a frisk.”133 If 
the Court were to go one step further and formally recognize a 
fluctuating standard of reasonable suspicion, varying the level of 
proof needed to establish reasonable suspicion depending on the 
gravity of the offense at issue, it would be hard-pressed not to do so 
in the probable cause context. 
Aside from Justice Ginsburg’s suggestion in Florida v. J.L. that 
the Court might be open to a fluctuating standard of reasonable 
suspicion, which might be interpreted by some as possible support 
for a fluctuating standard of probable cause, the only other time a 
U.S. Supreme Court Justice has expressed support for a fluctuating 
standard of probable cause occurred seventy years ago. In 1949, 
Justice Jackson, dissenting in Brinegar v. United States, provided 
perhaps the strongest defense from the Supreme Court so far of the 
view that the amount of certainty necessary for a finding of probable 
cause should differ depending on the crime at issue: 
 
[I]f we are to make judicial exceptions to the Fourth Amendment 
. . ., it seems to me they should depend somewhat upon the 
                                                             
127 Id. 
128 Id. at 269. 
129 Id. 
130 Id. 
131 Id. at 272. 
132 Id. at 271. 
133 Id. at 273–74. 
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gravity of the offense. If we assume, for example that a child is 
kidnaped and the officers throw a roadblock about the 
neighborhood and search every outgoing car, it would be a 
drastic and undiscriminating use of the search. The officers 
might be unable to show probable cause for searching any 
particular car. However, I should candidly strive hard to sustain 
such an action, executed fairly and in good faith, because it 
might be reasonable to subject travelers to that indignity if it was 
the only way to save a threatened life and detect a vicious crime. 
But I should not strain to sustain such a roadblock and universal 
search to salvage a few bottles of bourbon and catch a 
bootlegger.134 
 
Writing in 1949, which was seventy years ago, Justice Jackson 
was alone in arguing that police should be given more leeway to 
search when the underlying offense is a vicious crime and less 
leeway when the underlying crime is less serious. Since 1949, the 
Court has not once expressed support for Justice Jackson’s view that 
the amount of certainty needed for probable cause should fluctuate 
based on the gravity of the offense at issue.  
In recent years, however, a growing number of prominent legal 
scholars have argued that the Fourth Amendment should pay 
attention to the underlying crime at issue.  Despite Justice Jackson’s 
failure to convince his colleagues on the Supreme Court to adopt a 
fluctuating standard of probable cause, the dominant view in legal 
scholarship today appears to be that the Fourth Amendment pays too 
little attention to the gravity of the underlying offense as reflected in 
the substantive criminal law and that in ignoring distinctions among 
crimes, the Fourth Amendment is problematically 
transsubstantive.135 Most legal scholars who have addressed this 
issue have argued for a sliding scale approach under which the 
Fourth Amendment would give the police more authority to search 
and seize and require less certainty when dealing with more serious 
offenses than when dealing with less serious offenses.136 A few 
                                                             
134 Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 183 (1949) (Jackson, J., dissenting). 
135 William J. Stuntz, O.J. Simpson, Bill Clinton, and the Transsubstantive Fourth 
Amendment, 114 HARV. L. REV. 842, 843, 847 (2001) (“Fourth Amendment law 
is transsubstantive: it applies the same standard to [O.J.] Simpson’s case as to the 
case of Lance and Susan Gates, an Illinois couple who were charged with selling 
marijuana out of their house, and whose appeal gave the Supreme Court the 
opportunity to define (or redefine) probable cause”).  
136 See, e.g., Eugene Volokh, Crime Severity and Constitutional Line-Drawing, 
90 VA. L. REV. 1957, 1958 (2004) (arguing “[c]onstitutional Law shouldn't be 
forced into unitary rules that underprotect rights when the government interest in 
preventing a crime is minor, or underprotect government power when the interest 
is great"); Jeffrey Bellin, Crime-Severity Distinctions and the Fourth Amendment: 
Reassessing Reasonableness in a Changing World, 97 IOWA L. REV. 1 (2011) 
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scholars have made similar arguments in the specific context of 
probable cause, arguing that courts should employ a sliding scale 
approach to probable cause, decreasing the amount of certainty 
required for a finding of probable cause the more serious the crime 
and increasing the amount of certainty for less serious crimes.137 
                                                             
(suggesting crime severity should be incorporated into Fourth Amendment 
doctrine); Richard Frase, What Were They Thinking? Fourth Amendment 
Unreasonableness in Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, 71 FORDHAM L. REV. 329, 
420 (2003) (arguing that legal scholars failed to help U.S. Supreme Court reach a 
correct result in Atwater because few emphasized the importance of offense 
severity in reasonableness balancing analysis); William A. Schroeder, Factoring 
the Seriousness of the Offense into Fourth Amendment Equations—Warrantless 
Entries into Premises: The Legacy of Welsh v. Wisconsin, 38 U. KAN. L. REV. 
439 (1990) (arguing that warrantless searches should be prohibited in 
investigations of nonserious crimes); John Kaplan, The Limits of the Exclusionary 
Rule, 26 STAN. L. REV. 1027, 1046 (1974) (suggesting that the exclusionary rule 
should not apply to a short list of very serious offenses, including treason, 
espionage, murder, armed robbery, and kidnapping unless the police action shocks 
the conscience); Stuntz, supra note 135, at 848 (suggesting courts should take 
“differences among crimes into account when making probable cause 
determinations”). See also Sherry F. Colb, The Qualitative Dimension of Fourth 
Amendment "Reasonableness," 98 COLUM. L. REV. 1642, 1647 (1998) 
(suggesting that courts should find an ‘unreasonable’ search in violation of the 
Fourth Amendment occurs whenever the intrusiveness of a search outweighs the 
gravity of the offense being investigated.”). A few scholars oppose sliding scale 
approaches to the Fourth Amendment based upon the gravity of the crime. See, 
e.g., Yale Kamisar, "Comparative Reprehensibility" and the Fourth Amendment 
Exclusionary Rule, 86 MICH. L. REV. 1, 11-26 (1987) (providing numerous 
arguments against proposals for a serious crime exception to the exclusionary 
rule); Erik Luna, Drug Exceptionalism, 47 VILL. L. REV. 753, 784 (2002) ("sliding 
scale approaches to the Fourth Amendment (or criminal procedure doctrine in 
general) contain a variety of flaws or limitations, particularly when applied to drug 
crimes”); Kit Kinports, Probable Cause and Reasonable Suspicion: Totality Test 
or Rigid Rules?, 163 U. PA. L. REV. ONLINE 75, 81 (2014) (noting that "the Court 
has steered clear of this amorphous, ad hoc [sliding scale] approach [to probable 
cause] which 'could only produce more slide then scale’”), citing Anthony G. 
Amsterdam, Perspectives on the Fourth Amendment, 58 MINN. L. REV. 349, 394 
(1974); Anthony G. Amsterdam, Perspectives on the Fourth Amendment, 58 
MINN. L. REV. 349, 393-94 (1974) (arguing that adopting a sliding scale approach 
would convert the Fourth Amendment "into one immense Rohrshach blot” and 
would provide little or no guidance to police). See also, Christopher Slobogin, 
The World without a Fourth Amendment, 39 UCLA L. REV. 1, 51-52 (1991) 
(“Even assuming that the seriousness of past harm can be measured in any 
meaningful way, the seriousness of the crime  . . ., by itself, should be irrelevant 
to the degree of certainty police must have before the act “). 
137 See, e.g. Andrew Manuel Crespo, Probable Cause Pluralism, ___ YALE L.J. 
___ (forthcoming) (arguing that courts should embrace a pluralist view of 
probable cause that recognizes different analytic methods and standards of proof 
in different cases); Ronald J. Bacigal, Making the Right Gamble: The Odds on 
Probable Cause, 74 MISS. L.J. 279, 323 (2004) (arguing that “the fiction of one 
uniform definition of probable cause must be replaced with a flexible sliding scale 
that takes account of the severity of the intrusion and the magnitude of the threat 
“); Craig S. Lerner, The Reasonableness of Probable Cause, 81 TEX. L. REV. 951, 
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II 
 
How Probable is Probable Cause? 
 
As noted above, the Court has not been terribly clear about how 
much proof is necessary for a finding of probable cause. In terms of 
quantifying the amount of certainty needed for probable cause, the 
only thing a majority of the Court has stated definitively is that 
probable cause “‘means less than evidence which would justify 
condemnation’ or conviction” but “more than bare suspicion.”138 
This, however, does not provide much guidance since this just 
suggests that probable cause is more than a hunch but less than proof 
beyond a reasonable doubt. As Craig Lerner notes, “[T]he Court’s 
statement that probable cause is more than a suspicion and less than 
beyond a reasonable doubt places it somewhere between .0% and 
90%, which, when all is said and done, is not all that helpful.”139  
In 1983, a plurality of the Court provided perhaps the clearest 
statement to date as to where probable cause lies on the spectrum of 
certainty of guilt in a case about whether an officer’s seizure of 
contraband found in a car during a traffic stop fell within the plain 
view doctrine. In Texas v. Brown, Justice Rehnquist moved the 
needle significantly by stating that probable cause “does not demand 
any showing that such a belief be correct or more likely true than 
false.”140 Under this definition, probable cause does not have to rise 
                                                             
1014 (2003) (arguing that probable cause should be recast within a reasonableness 
framework and noting that “[t]he idea that probable cause—though famously 
touted as a single standard— may in fact fluctuate is not an altogether alien notion 
in the case law"). Judge Richard Posner, who retired in 2017, also expressed 
support for a fluctuating standard of probable cause. See Llaguno v. Mingey, 760 
3F 2nd 1560, 1565 (7th Cir. 1985) ("Probable cause— the area between bare 
suspicion and virtual certainty— describes not a point but a zone, within which 
the graver the crime the more latitude the police must be allowed”). But see Erica 
Goldberg, Getting Beyond Intuition in the Probable Cause Inquiry, 17 LEWIS & 
CLARK L. REV. 789 (2013) (arguing that the amount of certainty needed for 
probable cause should not vary with the gravity of the offense and proposing 
instead that courts assign a minimum percentage of certainty needed for a finding 
of probable cause). Compare Orin Kerr, Why Courts Should Not Quantify 
Probable Cause in THE POLITICAL HEART OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: ESSAYS ON 
THEMES OF WILLIAM J. STUNTZ (Klarman et al. ed 2012) (arguing that the Court 
should not specify exactly how much probability constitutes a “fair” probability 
sufficient for a finding of probable cause and should continue to let lower courts 
intuit whether probable cause exists). 
138 Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 175 (1949). 
139 Craig S. Lerner, The Reasonableness of Probable Cause, 81 TEX. L. REV. 951, 
996 (2003). 
140 Texas v. Brown, 460 U.S. 730, 742 (1983). The Texas v. Brown case was a 
case concerning the scope and applicability of the plain view doctrine. Id. at 733 
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to the level of more than a feather over fifty percent certainty, but 
constitutes something less than the preponderance of the evidence 
necessary for a plaintiff to prevail in a civil lawsuit. In short, 
according to Justice Rehnquist’s description of probable cause in 
Texas v. Brown, the amount of certainty needed for probable cause 
is not much certainty at all.   
 
A. Lower Courts  
 
Since 1983, hundreds of court opinions have repeated Justice 
Rehnquist’s statement in Texas v. Brown that probable cause does 
not demand a showing that the officer’s belief was more likely than 
not as if this pronouncement were settled law.141 Every federal 
Circuit Court of Appeals, except for the Third Circuit, and numerous 
state Supreme Courts have repeated this language. For example, in 
McReynolds v. State, in explaining the meaning of probable cause, 
the Supreme Court of Indiana wrote: 
 
The Supreme Court in Texas v. Brown attempted to provide 
some guidance as to when the evidentiary value is immediately 
apparent, holding that the third requirement [of the plain view 
doctrine] is met if the officer has probable cause to associate the 
property with criminal activity This standard merely required: 
“that the facts available to the officer would ‘warrant a man of 
reasonable caution in the belief’ that certain items may be 
contraband or stolen property or useful as evidence of a crime; 
it does not demand a showing that such a belief be correct or 
more likely true than false. A ‘practical, nontechnical’ 
probability that incriminating evidence is involved is all that is 
required.”142 
 
Similarly, in Williams v. Commonwealth, the Supreme Court of 
Kentucky repeated this language from Texas v. Brown in describing 
the proof necessary for a finding of probable cause as if it was settled 
law that probable cause does not mean more likely than not: 
 
As the United States Supreme Court has remarked, probable 
cause is a flexible, common-sense standard. It merely requires 
that the facts available to the officer would “warrant a man of 
                                                             
(“Because of apparent uncertainty concerning the scope and applicability of this 
[plain view] doctrine, we granted certiorari.”). 
141 A search for lower court cases repeating this language turned up over 450 
cases.  Memorandum from Stephanie Hansen to Cynthia Lee dated [date] (on file 
with author). 
142 McReynolds v. State, 460 N.E.2d 960, 963 (Ind. 1984), citing Texas v. Brown, 
460 U.S. at 742, 103 S. Ct. at 1543, 75 L.Ed.2d at 514. 
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reasonable caution in the belief,” that certain items may be 
contraband or stolen property or useful as evidence of a crime; 
it does not demand any showing that such a belief be correct or 
more likely true than false.143 
 
In Luster v. Nevada, the Supreme Court of Nevada repeated this 
language from Texas v. Brown to explain probable cause: 
 
The Supreme Court of the United States has held that probable 
cause in the context of the plain view doctrine "merely requires 
that the facts available to the officer would 'warrant a man of 
reasonable caution in the belief' that certain items may be 
contraband or stolen property or useful as evidence of a crime; 
it does not demand any showing that such a belief be correct or 
more likely true than false.144 
 
Similar reliance on Texas v. Brown can be found not only in 
other state Supreme Court opinions,145 but also in the federal courts. 
In United States v. Jones, for example, the First Circuit Court of 
Appeals quoted the same language from Texas v. Brown, writing as 
if a majority of the Court had set forth this low threshold of certainty 
for probable cause: 
 
In [Texas v.] Brown, the Court expounded upon the 
requirements of probable cause: Probable cause is a flexible, 
common-sense standard. It merely requires that the facts 
available to the officer would warrant a man of reasonable 
caution in the belief that certain items may be contraband or 
stolen property or useful as evidence of a crime; it does not 
demand any showing that such a belief be correct or more likely 
true than false.146 
 
                                                             
143 Williams v. Commonwealth, 147 S.W.3d 1, 7 (Ky. 2004). 
144 Luster v. Nevada, 115 Nev. 431, 435 n.3 (1999), citing Texas v. Brown, 460 
U.S. at 742. 
145 Pier v. State, 421 P.3d 565, 571 (Wyo. 2018); Ex parte State, 121 So. 3d 337, 
357 (Ala. 2013); State v. Flores, 996 A.2d 156, 161 (R.I. 2010); In re Care & 
Treatment of Chandler v. State, 382 S.C. 250, 257-58 (2009); Lynch v. State, 34 
Fla. L. Weekly 179, 33 Fla. L. Weekly 880 (2008); People v. Jones, 215 Ill. 2d 
261, 277 (2005); State v. Sinapi, 359 N.C. 394, 399 (2005); Wengert v. State, 364 
Md. 76, 90 (2001); People v. Custer, 465 Mich. 319, 332 (2001); State v. Bridges, 
963 S.W.2d 487, 494 (Tenn. 1997); People v. Melgosa, 753 P.2d 221, 227 (Colo. 
1988); State v. Wellman, 128 N.H. 340, 346 (1986); State v. Haselhorst, 218 Neb. 
233, 237 (1984).  
146 United States v. Jones, 187 F.3d 210, 220 (1st Cir. 1999), citing Texas v. 
Brown, 460 U.S. at 742, 103 S. Ct. at 1533. 
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The Second Circuit did the same in United States v. Barrios-
Moreira, quoting from Texas v. Brown to explain the meaning of 
probable cause: 
 
Probable cause is a flexible, common sense standard that 
"merely requires that the facts available to the officers would 
'warrant a man of reasonable caution in the belief' that certain 
items may be contraband . . . or useful as evidence of a crime; 
it does not demand any showing that such a belief be correct or 
more likely true than false.’”147 
 
Similar reliance on Texas v. Brown can be found in opinions 
from the Fourth Circuit,148 the Fifth Circuit,149 the Sixth Circuit,150 
the Seventh Circuit,151 the Eighth Circuit,152 the Ninth Circuit,153 the 
                                                             
147 United States v. Barrios-Moriera, 872 F.2d 12, 16-17 (2d Cir. 1989), citing 
Texas v. Brown, 460 U.S. at 742. 
148 United States v. Humphries, 372 F.3d 653, 660 (4th Cir. 2004) (“[W]e have 
stated that the probable-cause standard does not require that the officer’s belief be 
more likely true than false.”), citing United States v. Jones, 31 F.3d 1304, 1313 
(4th Cir. 1994); Jones, 31 F.3d 1304, 1313 (4th Cir. 1994) (“The probable cause 
standard does not demand any showing that such a belief be correct or more likely 
true than false.”), citing Texas v. Brown, 460 U.S. at 742 and acknowledging that 
Texas v. Brown was a plurality opinion.  
149 Crowder v. Sinyard, 884 F.2d 804, 821 n.22 (5th Cir. 1989) (“In defining 
‘probable cause’ in [the plain view doctrine] context, the Supreme Court has 
observed that… ‘it does not demand any showing that such a belief be correct or 
more likely true than false.’”), citing Texas v. Brown, 460 U.S. at 742, 103 S. Ct. 
at 1533, 75 L.Ed.2d 502 (1983). 
150 United States v. Mathis, 738 F.3d 719, 732 (6th Cir. 2013) (noting that 
“probable cause . . . does not demand any showing that such a belief be correct or 
more likely true than false."), citing Texas v. Brown, 460 U.S. at 742, 103 S. Ct. 
at 1533, 75 L.Ed.2d 502 (1983). 
151 United States v. McDonald, 723 F.2d 1288, 1295 (7th Cir. 1983). 
152 Yost v. Solano, 955 F.2d 541, 546 (8th Cir. 1992) (“Probable cause . . . does 
not demand any showing that such a belief be correct or more likely true than 
false”), citing Texas v. Brown, 460 U.S. at 742, 103 S. Ct. at 1533, 75 L.Ed.2d 
502 (1983). 
153 Dawson v. City of Seattle, 435 F.3d 1054, 1062 (9th Cir. 2006) (“The probable 
cause standard . . . does not demand any showing that such a belief be correct or 
more likely true than false.’”), citing Texas v. Brown, 460 U.S. at 742, 103 S. Ct. 
at 1533, 75 L.Ed.2d 502 (1983). 
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Tenth Circuit,154 the Eleventh Circuit,155 and the D.C. Circuit.156  
Indeed, the Seventh Circuit has gone so far as to suggest that the 
Supreme Court has often said that probable cause does not demand 
a showing of more likely than not, writing: 
 
As the Court frequently has remarked, probable cause is a 
flexible, common-sense standard. It merely requires that the 
facts available to the officer would 'warrant a man of reasonable 
caution in the belief, ' that certain items may be contraband or 
stolen property or useful as evidence of a crime; it does not 
demand any showing that such a belief be correct or more likely 
true than false.157 
 
While the Court has often said probable cause is a flexible 
common-sense standard, it has not frequently remarked that 
probable cause does not require a showing that the officer’s belief 
be more likely true than false.158 To the contrary, a majority of the 
Court has never treated this language from Texas v. Brown as 
controlling. 
 
B. Legal Scholars 
 
Not only have the lower courts treated Justice Rehnquist’s 
statement regarding probable cause in Texas v. Brown as settled law, 
a few prominent legal scholars have repeated this language as if it 
                                                             
154 United States v. Alderete, No. 18-1032, 2018 U.S. App. LEXIS 29831, at *13 
(10th Cir. Oct. 23, 2018) (“While probable cause is difficult to quantify, the 
Supreme Court has held that probable cause ‘does not demand any showing that 
such a belief be correct or more likely true than false.’”), citing Texas v. Brown, 
460 U.S. at 742, 103 S. Ct. at 1533, 75 L.Ed.2d 502 (1983). 
155 United States v. Wright, 324 F. App'x 800, 804 (11th Cir. 2009) (noting that 
probable cause “does not demand any showing that such a belief be correct or 
more likely true than false”), citing Texas v. Brown, 460 U.S. at 742, 103 S. Ct. 
at 1533, 75 L.Ed.2d 502 (1983). 
156 Dukore v. District of Columbia, 419 U.S. 799 F.3d 1137, 1142 (2015) (“The 
probable cause standard does ‘not demand any showing that such a belief be 
correct or more likely true than false’”), citing Texas v. Brown, 460 U.S. at 742, 
103 S. Ct. at 1533, 75 L.Ed.2d 502 (1983). 
157 United States v. McDonald, 723 F.2d 1288, 1295 (7th Cir. 1983) (emphasis 
added), citing Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160 (1949).  Brinegar v. United 
States, however, was decided in 1949, more than 30 years before Texas v. Brown, 
and the Court in Brinegar did not define probable cause as not more likely than 
not.  
158 Memorandum from Casey Matsumoto to Cynthia Lee dated January 17, 2019 
(describing research into whether the Supreme Court has repeated this language 
and noting that this language has been repeated only once by Justice Powell, 
dissenting in Arizona v. Hicks). 
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were settled law. For example, in explaining the probable cause 
standard for arrests, Kent Greenawalt has noted: 
 
The “probable cause” standard for arrests and seizures is not one 
of absolute certainty. In actual application by law enforcement 
officers and judges, the seriousness of the crime and concern 
about escape from the jurisdiction are likely to play a role in 
what probability is seen as necessary. However, in one standard 
formulation by the Supreme Court, probable cause for an arrest 
was present when officers had “knowledge” and “reasonably 
trustworthy information” of “’facts and circumstances . . . 
sufficient in themselves to warrant a man of reasonable caution 
in the belief that’ an offense has been or is being committed. 
This imprecise language standard suggests a likelihood 
approximating “more probable than not,” although the Court has 
specifically stated that probable cause “does not demand any 
showing that such a belief be correct or more likely true than 
false.”159 
 
Similarly, in examining the meaning of probable cause to arrest, 
Sherry Colb has explained: 
 
[T]he probable-cause standard “does not demand any showing 
that such a belief be correct or more likely true than false.” 
Though some of the cases are relatively old, the Court has not 
subsequently retreated from the position—however obliquely 
stated—that probable cause is something more than bare 
suspicion but something less than “more probable than not.”160 
 
III 
 
                                                             
159 Kent Greenawalt, Probabilities, Perceptions, Consequences and 
“Discrimination”: One Puzzle About Controversial “Stop and Frisk,” 12 OHIO 
ST. J. CRIM. L. 181, 186 (2014) (emphasis added). 
160 Sherry F. Colb, Probabilities in Probable Cause and Beyond: Statistical 
Versus Concrete Harms, 73 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 69, 72 (2010).  Some legal 
scholars have recognized that Texas v. Brown was a plurality opinion. See Ronald 
J. Bacigal, Making the Right Gamble: The Odds on Probable Cause, 74 MISS. L.J. 
279, 289 (2004) (noting that Texas v. Brown was a plurality opinion and that “[a] 
majority of the Court has never explicitly held that probable cause is less than a 
preponderance of the evidence”); Arnold H. Loewy, Protecting Citizens From 
Cops and Crooks: An Assessment of the Supreme Court’s Interpretation of the 
Fourth Amendment During the 1982 Term, 62 N.C. L. REV. 329, 340 n. 66 (1984); 
Erica Goldberg. Getting Beyond Intuition in the Probable Cause Inquiry, 17 
LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 789, 801 n. 62 (2013) (“A plurality of the Supreme Court 
has stated that the probable cause standard ‘does not demand any showing that 
such a belief [of criminal wrongdoing] be correct or more likely true than false’”). 
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Why Lower Courts Should Not Follow Justice Rehnquist’s 
Comment on the Meaning of Probable Cause in Texas v. Brown 
 
Lower courts should not follow Justice Rehnquist’s statement in 
Texas v. Brown about probable cause not needing to rise to the level 
of more likely than not for several reasons. First, Justice Rehnquist’s 
definition of probable cause should not be followed because Texas 
v. Brown was just a plurality opinion and Justice Rehnquist’s 
definition of probable cause was not necessary or essential to the 
judgment in Texas v. Brown. Second, Justice Rehnquist’s suggestion 
that probable cause should mean something less than “more likely 
than not” is misguided as a matter of history, precedent, and logic. 
Third, setting the bar for probable cause so low exacerbates the 
racial disparity in arrest patterns that already exists today. 
 
A. Texas v. Brown was Just a Plurality Opinion and Justice 
Rehnquist’s Description of Probable Cause Was Not 
Necessary to the Judgment 
 
First, lower courts need not follow Justice Rehnquist’s 
description of probable cause in Texas v. Brown because Texas v. 
Brown was just a plurality opinion.  In 1983, Justice Rehnquist was 
only able to get three other Justices to sign onto his opinion. Not 
only was Texas v. Brown just a plurality opinion, Justice Rehnquist’s 
statement on the showing necessary for a finding of probable cause 
was not necessary to the judgment.  
As James F. Spriggs II and David R. Stras explain, a plurality 
decision is one in which “a majority of Justices agree upon the result 
or judgment in a case but fail to agree upon a single rationale in 
support of the judgment.”161 Importantly, “an opinion concurring in 
the judgment is the functional equivalent of a dissent from the 
plurality’s reasoning even if it represents agreement with the result 
reached in the case.”162  
It is widely agreed that a plurality opinion “carr[ies] less 
precedential weight”163 than a majority opinion because a plurality 
opinion “represents nothing more than the views of the individual 
                                                             
161 James F. Spriggs II & David R. Stras, Explaining Plurality Decisions, 99 GEO. 
L.J. 515, 517 (2011). 
162 Id. at 520. 
163 John F. Davis & William L. Reynolds, Juridicial Cripples: Plurality Opinions 
in the Supreme Court, 1974 DUKE L.J. 59, 62. See also Pamela C. Corley, 
Uncertain Precedent: Circuit Court Responses to Supreme Court Plurality 
Opinions, 37 AM. POL. RES. 30, 35 (2009) (finding that lower courts are less likely 
to treat a plurality decision positively and more likely to treat that decision 
negatively or neutrally).  
 
33 PROBABLE CAUSE WITH TEETH [August-15-19] 
 
 
 
justices who join in the opinion.”164 Just how much less precedential 
weight, however, is a matter of disagreement.165  
In 1977, the Supreme Court sought to provide guidance to lower 
courts with respect to splintered Supreme Court decisions. In Marks 
v. United States, the Court set forth the following rule of thumb: 
“When a fragmented Court decides a case and no single rationale 
explaining the result enjoys the assent of five Justices, ‘the holding 
of the Court may be viewed as that position taken by those Members 
who concurred in the judgments on the narrowest grounds . . .’”166  
Marks was a short opinion and seemed to offer a simple 
resolution to the problem of deciding which opinion to follow when 
there is a plurality opinion and opinions concurring in the judgment 
of the plurality but offering different rationales for that judgment, 
but has proven difficult to apply in practice.167 For example, lower 
courts have not been able to agree on which opinion to follow in 
Missouri v. Seibert, a 2004 Supreme Court case addressing the 
constitutionally of a two-stage police interrogation strategy known 
as “question first, warn later” under which police officers would 
deliberately fail to give a suspect in custody the Miranda warnings 
prior to an initial custodial interrogation even though required by 
Miranda v. Arizona, in the hopes of obtaining a confession. After 
obtaining the desired confession, the police would give the Miranda 
warnings and interrogate the suspect again, getting the suspect to 
repeat the earlier confession.168 The government then would 
concede that the first unwarned confession was inadmissible, but 
argue that the second warned confession should be admitted into 
evidence since police gave the suspect the required Miranda 
warnings prior to obtaining that second confession. 
                                                             
164 Davis & Reynolds, supra note 163, at 61.  
165 Some have argued that only the result of the plurality decision (and not the 
legal reasoning on which the decision was based) should be treated as binding. 
Ryan C. Williams, Questioning Marks: Plurality Decisions and Precedential 
Constraint, 69 Stan. L. Rev. 795, 823 (2017) (“Some distinguished commentators 
on the common law have urged that only the result of the precedent-setting case 
should be treated as binding”). Others have suggested that lower courts should 
“give precedential effect to at least some aspects of the reasoning through which 
the precedent-setting court arrived at its decision.” Id. at 824. Yet others have 
suggested that lower courts should follow both the specific result in a plurality 
opinion and the “broader rule or rationale that the precedent court articulated in 
explaining that result.” Id. at 824–25. 
166 Marks v. United States, 430 U.S. 188, 193 (1977), citing Gregg v. Georgia, 
428 U.S. 153 (1976). 
167 Spriggs & Stras, supra note 161, at 568 (noting that the Marks rule is 
“notoriously difficult to apply”). Even the Supreme Court itself has acknowledged 
that the Marks rule has “baffled” lower courts trying to apply it. Grutter v. 
Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 325 (2003). 
168 Missouri v. Seibert, 542 U.S. 600, 605–06 (2004). 
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Writing for a plurality of the Court in Missouri v. Seibert, Justice 
Souter ruled that the subsequent warned confession following an 
earlier unwarned confession had to be thrown out.169 According to 
Justice Souter, in two-stage interrogation cases, the proper test to 
apply is to ask whether it would be reasonable to find that under the 
circumstances the Miranda warnings could function “effectively” as 
Miranda requires.170 As Justice Souter explained: 
 
The threshold issue when interrogators question first and warn 
later is thus whether it would be reasonable to find that in these 
circumstances the warnings could function ‘effectively’ as 
Miranda requires. Could the warnings effectively advise the 
suspect that he had a real choice about giving an admissible 
statement at that juncture? Could they reasonably convey that he 
could choose to stop talking even if he had talked earlier?171 
 
Justice Souter expressly declined to apply fruit of the poisonous 
tree analysis, noting that the Court had in a previous case involving 
a two-stage interrogation rejected fruit of the poisonous tree 
analysis.172 In light of that prior case, Justice Souter felt that “[i]n a 
sequential confession case, clarity is served if the later confession is 
approached by asking whether in the circumstances the Miranda 
warnings given could reasonably be found effective.”173 
Justice Breyer, who joined Justice Souter’s opinion, wrote a 
separate concurring opinion in which he suggested the proper 
approach was not to ask whether the Miranda warnings functioned 
effectively (the plurality’s test), but instead to treat the initial failure 
to warn—the Miranda violation—as a constitutional violation and 
apply fruit of the poisonous tree analysis to that Miranda 
violation.174 As Justice Breyer explained, “In my view, the 
following simple rule should apply to the two-stage interrogation 
technique: Courts should exclude the “fruits” of the initial unwarned 
questioning unless the failure to warn was in good faith.”175 Under 
Justice Breyer’s test, the subsequent warned confession would 
constitute tainted fruit of the initial Miranda violation and would 
thus be inadmissible unless the initial failure to warn was in good 
faith, i.e. not deliberately done in the hopes of getting a confession.  
Justice Breyer noted that he believed the plurality’s test “in 
practice will function as a ‘fruits’ test” because the only time a court 
                                                             
169 Id. at 617.  
170 Id. at 611–12.  
171 Id. at 611–12.  
172 Id. at 612 n.4 (referencing Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. at 300).  
173 Id. at 612 n.4.  
174 Missouri v. Seibert, 542 U.S. 600, 617 (2004) (Breyer, J., concurring).  
175 Id. at 617 (Breyer, J., concurring). 
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would conclude that the Miranda warnings functioned effectively 
would be only when “certain circumstances—a lapse in time, a 
change in location or interrogating officer, or a shift in the focus of 
the questioning—intervene between the unwarned questioning and 
any postwarning statement.”176 Justice Breyer’s proposed test 
differed from the plurality’s test in two significant ways. First, the 
intent of the officer would matter under Justice Breyer’s test, but not 
under the plurality test. Justice Breyer would exclude the subsequent 
confession unless the failure to warn was in good faith, i.e. not 
deliberate while Justice Souter explicitly noted in a footnote that his 
test focused on the facts of the case, not the intent of the officer.177 
Second, Justice Breyer’s test would apply fruit of the poisonous 
doctrine and treat the initial failure to warn as a constitutional 
violation whereas Justice Souter’s plurality opinion explicitly 
rejected fruits analysis in line with other Supreme Court decisions 
refusing to treat a Miranda violation as a constitutional violation. 
Justice Kennedy did not join the plurality opinion, and merely 
concurred in the plurality’s judgment. Like Justice Breyer, Justice 
Kennedy wrote a separate concurring opinion in which he proposed 
a test that, unlike the plurality’s test, turned on whether the initial 
failure to warn was deliberate.178 Under Justice Kennedy’s 
approach, if the initial failure to warn was deliberate, then not only 
would the initial confession be inadmissible as a violation of the 
Miranda rule, but the subsequent warned confession would also be 
inadmissible unless the police took specific curative measures, i.e. 
measures to cure the initial failure to warn.179 Justice Kennedy then 
provided examples of specific curative measures that could be 
considered by the court deciding whether to admit the second 
warned confession, including “a substantial break in time and 
circumstances between the prewarning statement and the Miranda 
warning” and an additional warning explaining to the suspect that 
                                                             
176 Id. at 618 (Breyer, J., concurring). 
177 Id. at 616 n.6.  
178 Missouri v. Seibert, 542 U.S. 600, 618 (2004) (Kennedy, J., concurring) 
(“Although I agree with much in the careful and convincing opinion for the 
plurality, my approach does differ in some respects, requiring this separate 
statement”). Justice Kennedy took pains to distinguish Ms. Seibert’s case from 
Oregon v. Elstad, a case in which the police officer’s initial failure to warn was 
inadvertent. Id. at 620. According to Justice Kennedy, “This case presents 
different considerations. The police [in this case] used a two-step questioning 
technique based on a deliberate violation of Miranda. The Miranda  warning was 
withheld to obscure both the practical and legal significance of the admonition 
when finally given.” Id. at 620.  
179 Id. at 621(Kennedy, J., concurring) (“When an interrogator uses this deliberate, 
two-step strategy, predicated upon violating Miranda during an extended 
interview, postwarning statements that are related to the substance of prewarning 
statements must be excluded absent specific, curative steps”).  
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her first confession most likely could not be used against her in 
court.180 Since no such curative steps were taken in this case, Justice 
Kennedy agreed with the plurality that Seibert’s postwarning 
statements were inadmissible and her conviction could not stand.181 
According to Charles Weisselberg, at least six federal circuits 
have chosen to follow Justice Kennedy’s approach, asking first 
whether the violation of Miranda was deliberate and if it was 
deliberate, then asking whether curative measures were taken.182 
Other circuits either combine aspects of the plurality’s test and 
Justice Kennedy’s test or have declined to decide which controls.183 
Presumably the lower courts are following concurring Justice 
Kennedy’s curative measures test because they believe his test is the 
narrowest of the tests offered by the different opinions in Seibert, 
thus satisfying the Marks standard that “the holding of the Court 
may be viewed as that position taken by those Members who 
concurred in the judgments on the narrowest grounds.”184 At first 
glance, it may appear that Justice Kennedy’s curative measures test 
is narrower than Justice Souter’s test since Justice Kennedy’s test 
only applies to two-stage interrogations where the officer’s use of 
the question first-warn later strategy is a deliberate or intentional 
tactical choice, whereas Justice Souter’s test applies to all two-stage 
interrogations regardless of the officer’s intent.185  
The problem is that if we count up the votes, all of the Justices, 
except Justice Kennedy and Justice Breyer, opposed a test that 
turned on the officer’s subjective intent, so following Justice 
Kennedy’s approach would be following an approach that was 
rejected by seven of the nine Justices. Justice Souter was careful to 
note in his plurality opinion that in cases involving the admissibility 
of a subsequent warned confession following an unwarned 
confession, the court should focus on the facts of the case rather than 
on the intent of the officer, explaining that “[b]ecause the intent of 
the officer will rarely be as candidly admitted as it was here (even 
as it is likely to determine the conduct of the interrogation), the focus 
is on the facts apart from intent that show the question-first tactic at 
work.”186 While the four dissenting Justices—Justice O’Connor, 
Chief Justice Rehnquist, Justice Scalia, and Justice Thomas—did 
not like Justice Souter’s proposed solution to the problem of two 
stage interrogations, they agreed with the plurality that the analysis 
                                                             
180 Id. at 622 (Kennedy, J., concurring).  
181 Id. at 622.  
182 Charles Weisselberg, Mourning Miranda, 96 CAL. L. REV. 1519, 1551 (2008). 
183 Id. 
184 Marks v. United States, 430 U.S. 188, 193 (1977). 
185 Missouri v. Seibert, 542 U.S. 600, 622 (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
186 Id. at 616 n.6.  
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should not focus on the subjective intent of the interrogating 
officer.187  
As seen from the discussion above, lower courts generally 
follow the judgment of a plurality opinion, treating it as precedent, 
but they do not always follow the reasoning of the plurality opinion 
or even tests proposed in the plurality opinion. Through its Marks 
decision, the Supreme Court has given lower courts the green light 
to follow the reasoning of a concurring opinion rather than the 
plurality opinion.  
Bringing the discussion back to Texas v. Brown, what all of this 
means is that while lower courts may justifiably follow the judgment 
of Justice Rehnquist’s plurality opinion in Texas v. Brown, which 
was a finding that the seizure met the requirements of the plain view 
doctrine, they need not and should not follow Justice Rehnquist’s 
characterization of probable cause as requiring less than a 
preponderance of the evidence since this comment was not agreed 
on by a majority of the Court.  Justice Powell, joined by Justice 
Blackmun, concurred only in the judgment and not the reasoning of 
the plurality opinion, agreeing that the seizure in that case met the 
requirements for a plain view seizure, but refusing to join Justice 
Rehnquist’s opinion because he felt Justice Rehnquist’s critique of 
Coolidge v. New Hampshire went too far.188 Justice Stevens, with 
whom Justice Brennan and Justice Marshall joined, also concurred 
only in the judgment, but refused to join Justice Rehnquist’s 
plurality opinion because he felt the plurality gave “inadequate 
consideration to [Supreme Court] cases holding that a closed 
container may not be opened without a warrant.”189 These Justices 
expressly refused to join anything other than the plurality’s 
judgment that the seizure of the heroin in question satisfied the 
requirements of the plain view doctrine. 
Tellingly, Justice Rehnquist himself did not rest the finding that 
there was probable cause to believe the balloon seized by the officer 
contained heroin on his not more likely true than false comment, 
simply concluding that given the officer’s experience as a narcotics 
detective, there was probable cause to support the seizure.190 Justice 
Rehnquist did not ask whether the officer’s belief that there was 
contraband in the balloon was more likely true than false. He simply 
concluded that “it is plain that Officer Maples had probable cause to 
believe that the balloon in Brown’s hand contained an illicit 
                                                             
187 Id. at 623 (O’Connor, J., dissenting) (“the plurality correctly declines to focus 
its analysis on the subjective intent of the interrogating officer”). 
188 Texas v. Brown, 460 U.S. at 744 (Powell, J., concurring) (“I do not join the 
plurality’s opinion because it goes well beyond the application of the [plain view] 
exception”). 
189 Id. at 747 (Stevens, J., concurring). 
190 Id. at 742–43. 
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substance,” given his “participation in previous narcotics arrests and 
from discussions with other officers.”191  
 
B. Justice Rehnquist’s View of Probable Cause is Misguided as 
a Matter of History, Precedent and Logic 
 
A second reason lower courts should reject Justice Rehnquist’s 
statement in Texas v. Brown that probable cause does not demand 
any showing that the officer’s belief “be correct or more likely true 
than false”192 is that this understanding of probable cause is 
misguided as a matter of history, precedent, and logic.   
 
 1. History 
 
                                                             
191 Id. One might even argue that Justice Rehnquist’s comment defining probable 
cause as not more likely true than false was merely dicta and therefore is not 
controlling. It is well settled that dicta is not controlling. See Humphrey’s 
Executor v. United States, 295 U.S. 602, 627 (1935) (noting that dicta is “not 
controlling”). Judges often suggest that distinguishing between holdings and dicta 
is a “routine, noncontroversial matter,” Michael C. Dorf, Dicta and Article III, 
142 U. PA. L. REV. 1997, 2003 (1994). Legal scholars, however, have struggled 
to define and distinguish between holdings and dicta. Black’s Law Dictionary 
defines “obiter dictum” as “a judicial comment made while delivering a judicial 
opinion, but one that is unnecessary to the decision in the case and therefore not 
precedential.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014). Michael Abramowicz 
and Maxwell Stearns have suggested a perhaps clearer way of distinguishing 
holdings from dicta. According to Abramowicz and Stearns, “A holding consists 
of those propositions along the chosen decisional path or paths of reasoning that 
(1) are actually decided, (2) are based upon the facts of the case, and (3) lead to 
the judgment. If not a holding, a proposition stated in a case counts as dicta.” 
Michael Abramowicz & Maxwell Stearns, Defining Dicta, 57 STAN. L. REV. 953, 
1065 (2005). Under either of these definitions, Justice Rehnquist’s comment 
about probable cause not needing to be more likely true than false seems to qualify 
as dicta. Under the Black’s Law Dictionary definition of dicta, Justice Rehnquist’s 
comment on probable cause is dicta because it was a judicial comment made while 
delivering a judicial opinion, but was unnecessary to the decision in the case. 
Under the Abramowicz and Stearns definition of dicta, Justice Rehnquist’s 
comment also qualifies as dicta because it did not lead to the judgment. Justice 
Rehnquist did not apply his not more likely true than false standard when 
evaluating whether the officer had probable cause to believe the balloon in 
question contained contraband. He simply concluded that “it is plain” that the 
officer had the probable cause. Texas v. Brown, 460 U.S. at 742. Moreover, the 
issue before the Court was whether the “immediately apparent” requirement of 
the plain view doctrine requires that the officer know he is viewing contraband or 
evidence of a crime or whether probable cause is sufficient, not how much 
certainty is required for a finding of probable cause. Id. at 741–42. The Court of 
Criminal Appeals had suggested that the officer “had to know that ‘incriminating 
evidence was before him, when he seized the balloon.’” Id. at 735. Three judges 
below had dissented on the ground that the officer just needed probable cause. Id. 
192 Texas v. Brown, 460 U.S. at 742. 
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If we think about why the founding fathers included the Fourth 
Amendment in the Bill of Rights, it is clear that the Framers wanted 
to make sure the police did not have unconstrained power to search 
and seize.193  As Thomas Davies explains, the Fourth Amendment 
was primarily a response to the Crown’s use of general warrants to 
conduct revenue searches of houses.194 Accordingly, at the time of 
the framing, bare probable cause that a crime had likely been 
committed was not sufficient to justify an arrest, whether with or 
without a warrant.195 According to Davies, an arrest was justified 
only if there was (1) a sworn accusation that a crime had in fact been 
committed, and (2) probable cause as to the identity of the culprit.196 
This more stringent common law standard for probable cause than 
the standard that applies today was a response to the fact that 
arbitrary arrests upon order of the Crown were “a salient historical 
abuse of criminal-justice power in English constitutional history.”197  
Allowing police to arrest persons based on less than a fifty-fifty 
certainty that the arrestee is involved in criminal activity gives 
police virtually unconstrained power to arrest similar to the power 
                                                             
193 See, e.g., Camara v. Mun. Court of S.F., 387 U.S. 523, 528 (1967) (“The basic 
purpose of this Amendment, as recognized in countless decisions of this Court, is 
to safeguard the privacy and security of individuals against arbitrary invasions by 
governmental officials.”); see also WILLIAM J. CUDDIHY, THE FOURTH 
AMENDMENT: ORIGINS AND ORIGINAL MEANING 602–1791 767 (2009) (“By 
requiring that all warrants be specific and by abrogating multiple categories of 
search and seizure, the framers of the amendment hoped to shield the people, not 
just their houses, from all unreasonable searches and seizures by the federal 
government.”) [full text available online at 
http://www.oxfordscholarship.com.gwlaw.idm.oclc.org/view/10.1093/acprof:os
o/9780195367195.001.0001/acprof-9780195367195]; David E. Steinberg, An 
Original Misunderstanding: Akhil Amar and Fourth Amendment History, 42 SAN 
DIEGO L. REV. 227, 230 (2005) (“Historical sources indicate that the framers were 
focused on a single, narrow problem—physical invasion of houses by government 
agents. The Fourth Amendment was enacted to address this problem with a 
precise, bright-line rule. Before entering a house, law enforcement officers 
typically would need to obtain a specific warrant.”); David E. Steinberg, The 
Original Understanding of Unreasonable Searches and Seizures, 56 FLA. L. REV. 
1051, 1053 (2004) (“A review of history demonstrates that the Fourth 
Amendment was intended to proscribe only a single discrete activity—physical 
searches of houses pursuant to a general warrant, or no warrant at all.”); Thomas 
K. Clancy, The Purpose of the Fourth Amendment and Crafting Rules to 
Implement That Purpose, 48 U. RICH. L. REV. 479, 522 (2014) (“The Fourth 
Amendment was designed by the framers to protect individuals from the 
government”).  
194 Thomas Y. Davies, How the Post-Framing Adoption of the Bare-Probable-
Cause Standard Drastically Expanded Government Arrest and Search Power, 73 
LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS 1, 4 (2010). 
195 Id. at 11. 
196 Id. 
197 Id. 
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accorded law enforcement in pre-founding England. This could not 
have been something that the framers of our Constitution wanted. 
It would be a mistake, however, to rely entirely on history as the 
reason to reject the more likely than not standard. As Richard Frase 
points out, “much has changed in American society, law, and 
criminal justice since the Founding era.”198 Indeed, such change was 
a big reason why the Supreme Court in Tennessee v. Garner rejected 
the common law rule that allowed police to shoot a fleeing felon if 
necessary to prevent the felon’s escape even if the felon did not pose 
a threat of death or serious bodily injury to the officer or others.199 
As Frase explains: 
 
In Garner, the changes had to do with the common-law’s 
authorization of the death penalty for almost all felonies, the 
dramatically different mix of offenses defined as a felony under 
modern criminal law, and major changes in police weaponry that 
made it much easier for modern police to kill fleeing suspects 
who pose no imminent danger to the officer.200  
 
At the time of the founding, we did not have “large professional 
police departments with officers constantly on patrol looking for 
minor violations.”201 Moreover, “custodial arrest for minor crimes 
was relatively rare in the Founding era.”202  
It would be a mistake to rely entirely on history to guide what 
should be done today not only because so much has changed in 
American society since the founding, but also because of the 
difficulty in determining that history. As David Sklansky notes, one 
problem with what he calls Justice Scalia’s new Fourth Amendment 
originalism—the idea that courts should look at early common law 
precedents and ask whether the government action in question 
constituted a search at the time of the framing to determine whether 
such action constitutes a search today—is that it is often difficult to 
figure out what was required at early common law either because 
there are no early common law decisions on point or the early 
common law precedents that do exist are inconsistent.203 
                                                             
198 Richard S. Frase, What Were They Thinking? Fourth Amendment 
Unreasonableness in Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, 71 FORDHAM L. REV. 329, 
345 (2002). 
199 Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1, 11 (1985). 
200 Frase, supra note 198, at 345. 
201 Id. at 346. 
202 Id. at 346 n.72. 
203 David A. Sklansky, The Fourth Amendment and Common Law, 100 COLUM. 
L. REV. 1739, 1794–96, 1806 (2000). 
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Inconsistent precedent allows judges to pick and choose the 
precedent that suits them.204  
Sklansky points out that in Wyoming v. Houghton, the very first 
case in which the full Court embraced Justice Scalia’s new Fourth 
Amendment originalism, “[s]trictly speaking, no ‘18th-century 
common law’ was found applicable by the Court,“ and “[i]nstead 
the majority relied on federal legislation in the late-eighteenth 
century authorizing warrantless inspections of ships by customs 
officers with probable cause to suspect the presence of 
contraband.”205 Sklansky concludes that “the majority in Houghton 
inferred from the Founding-era legislation that ‘the Framers’ would 
have thought the challenged search ‘reasonable.’”206 
Another example of the difficulty of ascertaining the law 
applicable at common law can been seen in Atwater v. City of Lago 
Vista, a case in which the Court was asked to rule on the 
constitutionality of allowing an officer with probable cause to 
believe that a minor fine-only traffic violation had taken place to 
effectuate a custodial arrest.207 Gail Atwater was pulled over by a 
police officer for driving without a seat belt and failing to secure her 
3-year-old son and 5-year-old daughter in seatbelts.208 Driving 
without a seatbelt in the City of Lago Vista, Texas at the time was a 
traffic violation with a maximum fine of $50.209 Even though 
Atwater did not pose a physical threat to the officer and the seat belt 
offense which the officer believed her to be violating was a fine-
only offense, the officer handcuffed Atwater with her hands behind 
her back, arrested her, and hauled her off to jail.  
The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals, which heard Atwater’s case 
below ruled in her favor, finding that the officer’s actions were 
unreasonable and in violation of the Fourth Amendment. That court 
described the facts of the case as follows: 
 
Gail Atwater and her family are long-term residents of Lago 
Vista, Texas, a suburb of Austin. She is a full-time mother and 
her husband is an emergency room physician at a local hospital. 
On the pleasant spring afternoon of March 26, 1997, as Gail 
Atwater was driving her children home after their soccer 
practice at 15 miles per hour through her residential 
neighborhood, she violated Section 545-413 of the Texas 
Transportation Code. Neither Gail Atwater, her four-year-old 
son nor her six-year-old daughter were wearing their seat belts. 
                                                             
204 Id. at 1794.  
205 Id. at 1760.  
206 Id. at 1760.  
207 Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, 532 U.S. 318 (2001). 
208 Id. at 323–24. 
209 Id. at 323.  
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Detecting this breach of the peace and dignity of the state, Lago 
Vista police officer, Bart Turek, set about to protect the 
community from the perpetration of such a crime. In doing so, 
he brought to bear the full panoply of means available to 
accomplish his goal—verbal abuse, handcuffs, placing Gail 
Atwater under custodial arrest, and hauling her to the local 
police station. It was not a proud moment for the City of Lago 
Vista.210 
 
Officer Turek could have simply issued Atwater a traffic citation 
and released her upon a promise to appear, but instead chose to 
handcuff Atwater with her hands behind her back, a tactic usually 
used when an officer fears that a suspect will try to harm the officer, 
and took Atwater to the police station where she was booked and 
placed in a jail cell for approximately an hour before being taken 
before a magistrate.211 Ultimately, Atwater entered a plea of no 
contest to not wearing a seat belt and allowing her children to not 
wear seat belts.212 After this incident, Atwater’s youngest child 
required counseling and Atwater was prescribed medication for 
nightmares, insomnia, and depression arising from the incident.213  
Atwater and her husband sued the City of Lago Vista, the Police 
Chief, and Officer Turek under 18 U.S.C. §1983, alleging violations 
of the Fourth Amendment and the Due Process Clause.214 After the 
Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals found that Officer Turek’s actions 
were constitutionally unreasonable and denied his claim of qualified 
immunity,215 the government appealed and the Supreme Court 
agreed to hear the case.  
Before the Supreme Court, Atwater argued that “‘founding-
era common-law rules’ forbade peace officers to make warrantless 
misdemeanor arrests except in cases of ‘breach of the peace,’ a 
category she claimed was then understood narrowly as covering 
only those nonfelony offenses ‘involving or tending toward 
violence.’”216 The Supreme Court, however, rejected this argument 
because it found the common law authorities were not consistent 
with respect to what was required for a lawful custodial arrest.217 As 
Justice Souter explained, “We begin with the state of pre-founding 
English common law and find that, even after making some 
allowance for variations in the common-law usage of the term 
                                                             
210 Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, 165 F.3d 380 (5th Cir. 1999).  
211 Id. at 383. 
212 Id. 
213 Id. 
214 Id. 
215 Id. at 389. 
216  Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, 532 U.S. 318, 327 (2001). 
217 Id. at  332. 
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‘breach of the peace,’ the ‘founding-era common-law rules’ were 
not nearly as clear as Atwater claims; on the contrary, the common-
law commentators (as well as the sparsely reported cases) reached 
divergent conclusions with respect to officers' warrantless 
misdemeanor arrest power.218 Accordingly, the Supreme Court 
reversed the judgment below, finding that because Officer Turek 
had probable cause to believe Mrs. Atwater had violated the seat belt 
laws, he acted reasonably when he arrested her and took her into 
custody. 
 
 2. Precedent 
 
An even more compelling reason to reject the view that probable 
cause means something less than “more likely than not” is 
precedent. While the Supreme Court’s pronouncements on probable 
cause have not been a model of clarity, the idea that probable cause 
is something less than “more likely than not” has never commanded 
a majority of the Court—neither before Texas v. Brown nor after.  
The Court instead has consistently resisted assigning any specific 
percentage to the concept of probable cause, explaining: 
 
More recently, we said that “the quanta . . . of proof” appropriate 
in ordinary judicial proceedings are inapplicable to the decision 
to issue a warrant. Finely tuned standards such as proof beyond 
a reasonable doubt or by a preponderance of the evidence, useful 
in formal trials, have no place in the magistrate’s decision. While 
an effort to fix some general, numerically precise degree of 
certainty corresponding to “probable cause” may not be helpful, 
it is clear that “only the probability, and not a prima facie 
showing, of criminal activity is the standard of probable 
cause.”219 
 
It may be that in rejecting the view that probable cause requires 
a specific quantum of evidence, like a preponderance of the 
evidence or proof beyond a reasonable doubt, the Court has simply 
not wanted to lock itself into quantifying the meaning of probable 
cause, leaving the ultimate decision as to whether there was 
probable cause to the magistrate-judge deciding before the fact 
whether to issue an arrest warrant or deciding after the fact whether 
police were justified in a warrantless arrest. Whatever its reasons, a 
majority of the Court has never repeated Justice Rehnquist’s 
statement that probable cause means something less than a 
preponderance of the evidence. Instead, it has time and again 
                                                             
218 Id. at 327–28. 
219 Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 233, 238 (1983). 
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suggested that probable cause simply means something beyond a 
mere suspicion and something less than proof beyond a reasonable 
doubt.220 
 
 3. Logic 
 
Perhaps the most compelling reason to reject the notion that 
probable cause means something less than “more likely than not,” 
however, is logic.  It simply does not make sense to say that probable 
cause deals with probabilities, and then say that probable cause does 
not have to rise to the level of a preponderance of the evidence 
standard. If you ask someone, “Do you think it is going to rain 
tomorrow?” and the person says, “Yes, I think there is a fair 
probability that it will rain tomorrow” or “Yes, I have reasonable 
grounds to believe that it will rain tomorrow,” in other words, “I 
think there is probable cause that it will rain tomorrow,” it would 
not make sense for the person to then add, “and I think the likelihood 
of rain is less than 50%.” Similarly, when a police officer says, “I 
have probable cause to arrest Joe,” the officer is suggesting there is 
a fair probability or reasonable grounds to believe that a crime has 
been committed and that Joe committed it. It simply does not make 
sense to for the officer to then say, “and I think there is less than a 
fifty-fifty chance that Joe committed that crime.” 
If we look to other areas of the law where probable cause is the 
standard, we see that probable cause is understood to mean probably 
true. For example, a grand jury needs probable cause to issue an 
indictment, but probable cause in the grand jury context has a more 
robust meaning than Justice Rehnquist’s understanding of probable 
cause in Texas v. Brown. For example, the Model Grand Jury Charge 
instructs grand jurors as follows: 
 
25. To return an indictment charging an individual with an 
offense, it is not necessary that you find that individual guilty 
beyond a reasonable doubt. You are not a trial jury and your task 
is not to decide the guilt of innocence of the person charged. 
Your task is to determine whether the government’s evidence as 
presented to you is sufficient to cause you to conclude that there 
is probable cause to believe that the person being investigated 
committed the offense charged. To put it another way, you 
should vote to indict where the evidence presented to you is 
                                                             
220 Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 175 (1949). See also Illinois v. Gates, 
462 U.S. 213, 235 (1983) (repeating this language from Brinegar); Henry v. 
United States, 361 U.S. 98, 102 (1959) (“Evidence required to establish guilt is 
not necessary. On the other hand, good faith on the part of the arresting officers 
is not enough. Probable cause exists if the facts and circumstances known to the 
officer warrant a prudent man in believing that the offense has been committed.”).  
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sufficiently strong to warrant a reasonable person’s belief that 
the person being investigated is probably guilty of the offense 
charged.221 
 
The Model Grand Jury Charge is not without its faults,222 but 
many jurisdictions have adopted it and give their grand jurors the 
same instructions that appear in the Model Grand Jury Charge.223 
Some jurisdictions go even further than the Model Grand Jury 
Charge and instruct their grand jurors that they should not return an 
indictment “unless the government’s evidence would lead them to 
convict the accused at trial.”224 
 
C. Lowering the Threshold of Certainty for Probable Cause 
Allows for More Arbitrary Arrests and Exacerbates a Pre-
existing Problem of Racial Disparity in Arrests  
 
Finally, Justice Rehnquist’s very low threshold of certainty for 
probable cause gives police broad discretion to arrest individuals 
who may or may not be involved in criminal activity, exacerbating 
                                                             
221 MODEL GRAND JURY CHARGE (JUD. CONF. OF U.S. 2005) (emphasis added). Congress 
has granted authority to the Judicial Conference of the United States to “adopt 
rules and regulations governing [grand jury procedure].” 28 U.S.C. §1863(a). 
222 United States v. Navarro-Vargas, 408 F.3d 1184 (9th Cir. 2005). 
223 Id. at 1197 (noting that “a majority of the states have adopted instructions 
similar to the federal model instructions”). Alabama’s model grand jury 
instructions go even further than the Model Grand Jury Charge and instructs grand 
jurors that if they find probable cause to believe the target has committed a crime, 
they must indict. ALABAMA JUDICIAL SYSTEM, GENERAL JURY 
INSTRUCTION (Adopted Nov.13, 
2014), http://judicial.alabama.gov/docs/library/docs/General_Jury_Instructions.p
df (instructing that, as to felonies, whenever the legal evidence received by a 
Grand Jury establishes probable cause to believe that a felony has been committed 
and that a particular person has committed that offense, then the Grand Jury must 
return a true bill of indictment). In contrast, some states tell their grand jurors that 
they may indict if they find probable cause. See, e.g., NEW YORK STATE OFFICE 
OF COURT ADMINISTRATION, GRAND JURY IMPANELMENT INSTRUCTION NEW 
YORK (Rev. Jan. 2018), https://www.nycourts.gov/judges/cji/5-
SampleCharges/CJI2d.Grand-Jury_Rev.pdf. Ainstructing grand jury that they 
may indict a person for an offense when the testimony and any other evidence 
presented is, one, “legally sufficient” to establish that the person committed the 
offense, and two, provides “reasonable cause to believe that the person, in fact, 
committed the offense.”). 
224 Peter Arenella, Reforning the Federal Grand Jury and the State Preliminary 
Hearing to Prevent Conviction Without Adjudication, 78 MICH. L. REV. 463, 486 
(1980). Other jurisdictions simply equate probable cause to indict with probable 
cause to arrest. Id. at 485-86, citing U.S. Dep’t of Justice Materials Relating to 
Prosecutorial Discretion, 24 CRIM. L. REP. 3001, 3002 (BNA 1978) (treating the 
probable cause standard for a grand jury indictment the same as the probable cause 
standard for an arrest). 
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a pre-existing problem of racial disparity in arrests. Whether 
because of explicit or implicit racial biases of police officers 
themselves or of the persons who call the police, police officers 
often arrest black individuals in situations where they would not 
have arrested a white individual doing the same thing. For example, 
at approximately 4:35 PM on one April afternoon in 2018, two 
African American men entered the Center City Starbucks in 
Philadelphia, Pennsylvania to meet someone for a 4:45 p.m. 
business meeting.225 Immediately upon walking into the store, one 
of the men asked an employee who happened to be the manager of 
that Starbucks store for the code to the bathroom.226 After the 
manager told him that the restrooms were only for paying 
customers, the two men proceeded to sit at a table.227 A few seconds 
later, the manager approached the men and asked if she could get 
them any drinks.228 The men told the manager that they didn't need 
anything since they had bottles of water with them and they were 
waiting for another person.229 The manager asked the men to leave 
the store, and when they refused to leave, she called 911 and told 
the police that two men were in the store and were refusing to make 
a purchase or leave.230  
                                                             
225 Rachel Siegel, Men Arrested at Starbucks Describe Surprise, Fear, WASH. 
POST, April 20, 2018, at A14. 
226 Id. (“Immediately upon walking in, Nelson asked the manager if he could use 
the restroom.”). See also Ben Shapiro, That Philly Starbucks Has Several 
Cameras. So Why Won’t They Release Tape of a Racist Incident?, DAILY WIRE 
(Apr. 19, 2018), https://www.dailywire.com/news/29642/philly-starbucks-has-
several-cameras-so-why-wont-ben-shapiro (noting that in an interview on ABC 
News’ Good Morning America, two African American men who were arrested at 
a Starbucks while waiting for a business meeting said “they asked a barista for the 
code to the bathroom and were told they could hot have it because they had not 
yet purchased anything”).  
227 Siegel, Men Arrested at Starbucks Describe Surprise, Fear, supra note 225 
(noting that the manager told Nelson that the restrooms were for paying customers 
only, and Nelson “just left it at that”). [Editor – please note that I have included 
the article title since Rachel Siegel wrote more than one article on the 
Starbucks arrest that I cite to in this Article, and this way the reader will 
know which article by Rachel Siegel the footnote is referencing.] 
228 Id. (noting that “the manager came over to their table to ask if she could help 
with any drinks or water”) 
229 Id. (noting that the men told the manager that they had their own bottles of 
water and didn’t need anything). 
230 Id. (noting that the manager called the police at 4:37 p.m., just two minutes 
after the two African American men arrived at the Starbucks store). According to 
news reports of this incident, the manager was acting pursuant to store guidelines 
that required managers to ask nonpaying customers to leave the store and called 
police if they refused. Rachel Siegel, Starbucks Chairman Says Manager Showed 
‘Unconscious Bias’ in Calling 911, WASH. POST, Apr. 19, 2018, at A14 (reporting 
that according to a Starbucks spokesperson, “In this particular store, the guidelines 
were that partners must ask unpaying customers to leave the store, and police were 
to be called if they refused”). See also Jenny Gathright & Emily Sullivan, 
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At 4:41 PM, two officers from the Philadelphia Police 
Department arrived and told the men they had to leave.231 When they 
did not get up to leave, the officers handcuffed and arrested the men 
and, without reading them any rights or telling them why they were 
being arrested, took them into custody for trespassing and causing a 
disturbance.232 During the arrest, which was caught on cell phone 
video,233 the man with whom the two African American men were 
planning to meet arrived and asked the officers why the men were 
being arrested.234 On the video, that man, who is white, can be heard 
telling the officers that the two African American men were there to 
meet with him.235 The officers, however, refused to release the men 
and proceeded to take them down to the police station for 
booking.236  
The video of this arrest when viral, and amidst public outrage 
and charges of racial profiling, the CEO of Starbucks, Kevin 
                                                             
Starbucks, Police And Mayor Respond To Controversial Arrest Of 2 Black Men 
In Philly, NPR (Apr. 14, 2018, updated at 1:56 PM), 
https://www.npr.org/sections/thetwo-way/2018/04/14/602556973/starbucks-
police-and-mayor-weigh-in-on-controversial-arrest-of-2-black-men-in-ph 
(reporting that the men were asked to leave by the manager before she called 911 
and again by police officers when they arrived on the scene and they refused to 
leave both times). 
231 Siegel, Men Arrested at Starbucks Describe Surprise, Fear, supra note 225 
(“Officers arrived at 4:41, according to tapes released by the Philadelphia police 
this week”). 
232 Id. (noting that the men were arrested for trespassing and creating a 
disturbance); see also Elizabeth Dias, John Eligon & Richard A. Oppel Jr., 
Philadelphia Starbucks Arrests, Outrageous to Some, Are Everyday Life for 
Others, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 17, 2018), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/04/17/us/starbucks-arrest-philadelphia.html 
(reporting that the men were handcuffed and taken to police station to be booked). 
233 Rachel Siegl & Alex Horton, Starbucks CEO Calls for Bias Training, WASH. 
POST, April 17, 2018, at A2 (noting that “[a]t least two videos captured the tense 
moment when six Philadelphia police officers stood over two seated black men, 
asking them to leave”). 
234 See Outrage Grows Over Video Showing Two Black Men Arrested at 
Philadelphia Starbucks, NBC 10 (Apr. 14, 2018, 2:01 PM), 
https://www.nbcphiladelphia.com/news/local/Outrage-Over-Video-Showing-
Two-Black-Men-Arrested-at-Philadelphia-Starbucks-479771543.html.  
235 Id.  
236 See Dias, Philadelphia Starbucks Arrests, Outrageous to Some, Are Everyday 
Life for Others, supra note 232; Alex Horton, Starbucks CEO apologizes after 
employee calls police on black men waiting at a table, WASH. POST (Apr. 15, 
2018), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/business/wp/2018/04/14/starbucks-
apologizes-after-employee-calls-police-on-black-men-waiting-at-a-
table/?noredirect=on&utm_term=.708b6a0c96d2 (reporting that, according to 
their attorney, the men were taken to a police station, fingerprinted, and 
photographed, and that an officer suggested to the men that they faced charges for 
“defiant trespassing”).  
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Johnson, apologized to the two African American men. 237 Howard 
Schultz, former CEO of Starbucks and possible 2020 Presidential 
hopeful, acknowledged that the Starbucks manager, who was white, 
probably acted from unconscious bias when she decided to call the 
police.238 Starbucks also decided to close more than 8,000 of its 
stores on May 29, 2018, so its employees could undergo racial bias 
training.239 Within a few weeks, the men reached a settlement with 
the City of Philadelphia, which agreed to pay $1 to each man, fund 
a $200,000 program to help high school students aspiring to be 
                                                             
237 Rachel Siegel, Starbucks Chairman Says Manager Showed ‘Unconscious 
Bias’ in Calling 911, WASH. POST, Apr. 19, 2018, at A14 (reporting that Starbucks 
Chief Executive Office Kevin Johnson appeared on Fox Business Network’s 
“Mornings with Marta” and said he apologized to the two gentlemen for what 
happened to them). 
238 Id. Interestingly, Howard Schultz revealed his own unconscious racial bias at 
a CNN Town Hall in February 2019. When asked about the arrest of the two 
African American men at the Philadelphia Starbucks store, Schultz spoke about 
the decision to close all Starbucks stores in May 2018 so all Starbucks employees 
could undergo implicit bias training. Rachel Siegel, Starbucks’s bias training 
finally happened. Here’s what it looked like., WASH. POST (May 29, 2018),  
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/business/wp/2018/05/29/starbucks-
training-finally-happened-heres-what-it-looked-
like/?utm_term=.2e4584cee54f.  He then added that he doesn’t see color. 
Gregory Krieg & Vanessa Yurkevich, Schultz's claim he doesn't 'see color' at odds 
with Starbucks' 2018 anti-bias training videos, CNN (Feb. 14, 2019) 
https://www.cnn.com/2019/02/14/politics/howard-schultz-starbucks-racial-
bias-training-videos/index.html ("I didn't see color as a young boy, and I honestly 
don't see color now," Schultz said during the CNN town hall, describing his 
formative years "as a young boy in the projects. Of course, one who claims not 
to see race or color is simply denying the existence of implicit bias. All of us, 
including those of us who are egalitarian-minded and progressive, are influenced 
by racial and other stereotypes. Ellen Yaroshefsky, Waiting for the Elevator: 
Talking About Race, 27 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 1203, 1212–13 (2014); Charles R. 
Lawrence III, Passing and Trespassing in the Academy: On Whiteness As Property 
and Racial Performance As Political Speech, 31 HARV. J. RACIAL & ETHNIC JUST. 7, 30 
(2015); Anastasia M. Boles, The Culturally Proficient Law Professor: Beginning 
the Journey, 48 N.M. L. REV. 145, 168 (2018)(“When a microaggressor comments 
‘I don't see color,’ the hidden message is ‘I do not recognize your unique cultural 
experience and background,’ not ‘I am not racist.’”). 
239 Tracy Jan & Rachel Siegel, Race Training to Briefly Close Starbucks Shops, 
WASH. POST, April 18, 2018, at A22 (noting that “[p]ublic outrage over the arrest 
of two African-American men at a downtown Starbucks store sparked a corporate 
crisis that led the company to take the unprecedented step of announcing it would 
close more than 8,000 stores for an afternoon in May to train baristas on how to 
recognize their racial biases”). See also Christine Emba, Opinion, Starbucks’ 
Small Step Still Sets an Example, WASH. POST, Apr. 22, 2018, at A17 (noting that 
“Starbucks’ decision to shut down its stores on May 29 for a day of ‘racial-bias 
education’ training may not be enough to contain the backlash building against it” 
but that in doing this, “Starbucks is setting an unusually good example of what 
should be done when racism becomes a public problem in a public space”).  
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entrepreneurs, and help the men take courses to complete their 
Bachelor’s degrees.240  
Far from being an isolated incident, the April 2018 arrest at the 
Center City Starbucks simply happened to be caught on cell phone 
video. About the same time as the Starbucks incident, police in other 
cities and states were called to investigate several other African 
Americans who were doing things that ordinarily do not trigger calls 
for the police. For example, on April 21, five African American 
women were golfing at a golf course in a largely white suburban 
area when they were approached by someone claiming to be was the 
owner of the club (it turns out this man was not the owner of the 
club, but served in an advisory role for the gold course) who told the 
women that they were not keeping a quick enough pace and needed 
to leave.241 The man told the women, “You’re going too slow. I’ll 
give you a refund.”242 One of the women told the man, “Do you 
realize we’re the only black women on this course, and you’re only 
coming up to us? We paid, we want to play.”243 The man walked off 
in a huff.244 Three of the women left when the group reached the 
ninth hole because they were so shaken by the confrontation,245 but 
two of the women stayed and were about to start a second round 
when they were approached again, this time by one of the club’s 
owners and other employees, who told them that they had five 
minutes to leave and that the police had been called.246 The women 
were also offered checks to refund their memberships.247 The police 
                                                             
240 Rachel Siegel, Two Black Men Arrested at Starbucks Settle with Philadelphia 
for $1 Each, WASH. POST, May 2, 2018, 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/business/wp/2018/05/02/african-
american-men-arrested-at-starbucks-reach-1-settlement-with-the-city-secure-
promise-for-200000-grant-program-for-young-
entrepreneurs/?utm_term=.a602a3b4a02f (also available at 
https://perma.cc/BM5L-9A75). 
241 Christina Caron, 5 Black Women Were Told to Golf Faster. Then the Club 
Called the Police, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 25, 2018), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/04/25/us/black-women-golfers-york.html; 
Rachel Siegel, Police Called on Black Golfers After Complaints of Slow Play, 
WASH. POST, Apr. 25, 2018, at A13, 
https://www.providencejournal.com/news/20180424/pa-golf-club-calls-police-
after-telling-5-black-women-they-were-playing-too-slowly (last visited Feb. 17, 
2019). 
242 Siegel, Police Called on Black Golfers After Complaints of Slow Play, supra 
note 241. 
243 Id. 
244 Id. 
245 Id. 
246 Caron, supra note 241. 
247 Siegel, Police Called on Black Golfers After Complaints of Slow Play, supra 
note 241. 
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arrived, but left without arresting the women after deciding charges 
were not warranted.248 
In another incident around the same time, a young black female 
was napping in the common area of her dormitory at Yale University 
where she had been working on a paper when a white student 
confronted her around 1:30 a.m.249 The white student turned on the 
lights and said, “Is there someone in here? Is there someone sleeping 
in here? You’re not supposed to be here.”250 The white student then 
called campus police.251  
Lolade Siyonbola, the black woman who had fallen asleep on 
the couch, was a student at Yale University and lived in the same 
dormitory where she was found napping.252When campus police 
arrived, Sivonbola told them that she was a student at Yale and used 
her room key to open the door to her dorm room.253 The police, 
however, were not convinced that she belonged there and asked her 
to show identification.254 Siyonbola showed officers her student ID, 
but was detained by police for nearly twenty minutes while they 
investigated whether she was in fact a Yale University student.255 A 
spokesperson for Yale University explained that the encounter was 
drawn out because the name on Siyonbola’s campus ID was her 
preferred name, which did not match her name in university’s 
records.256  
In the end, the police left without formally arresting Siyonbola, 
who was earning a master’s degree in African studies at Yale.257 
Asked whether she felt the police acted appropriately, Siyonbola 
responded, “[A]bsolutely not. I know with absolute certainty that if 
I was white 1) the police would not have been called . . . and that 2) 
                                                             
248 Id.  
249 Tariro Mzezewa, Napping While Black (and other Transgressions), N.Y. 
TIMES (May 10, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/05/10/opinion/yale-
napping-racism-black.html. 
250 Id. 
251 Id. 
252 Matthew Ormseth, Yale Says Protocol Followed on Report of Black Woman, 
L.A. TIMES, May 11, 2018, at A8,  https://www.latimes.com/nation/nationnow/la-
na-yale-sleeping-student-20180510-story.html (last visited Feb. 17, 2019).  
253 Mzezewa, supra note 249. 
254 Id. 
255 Ormseth, supra note 252. 
256 id. 
257 Christina Caron, A Black Yale Student was Napping, and a White Student 
Called the Police, N.Y. TIMES (May 9, 2018), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/05/09/nyregion/yale-black-student-nap.html. 
Siyonbola founded the Yoruba Cultural Institute in Brooklyn and is the author of 
a book about African history and diaspora migration. Caron, supra note *257. 
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if they were, I would not have been detained for nearly 20 
(minutes).” 258 
More recently, on December 22, 2018, an African American 
man sitting in the lobby of the DoubleTree by Hilton hotel in 
Portland, where he was a registered guest, talking on his cellphone 
with his mother, was confronted by a white hotel security guard 
police who accused him of loitering, and then called the police.259 
Jermaine Massey was told by police to pack up his belongings and 
leave the hotel or face trespass charges,260 even after he told them 
he was a guest of the hotel and showed them his room key.261  
I have sat at a table at Starbucks without ordering anything 
(while my husband went to go purchase a coffee mug), and was not 
asked by store employees to leave. My husband, who is also an 
Asian American, has occupied a seat at a rival coffee shop without 
purchasing anything while waiting for me while I was making a 
purchase, and he has never been asked to purchase something or 
leave, let alone arrested by police for such action. I’m sure many 
non-black persons have been slow on the golf course without being 
                                                             
258 Matthew Ormseth, Yale President Defends Black Student In Racial Incident 
Where Police Were Called, Hartford Courant, May 11, 2018, 
https://www.courant.com/news/connecticut/hc-news-yale-police-response-
20180510-story.html. 
259 Associated Press, Portland, Oregon hotel fires two after police eject black 
guest from lobby, GUARDIAN, Dec. 29, 2019 16:50 EST, 
https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2018/dec/29/portland-oregon-hotel-fires-
two-police-eject-black-guest-lobby; Portland, Oregon, hotel calls cops on black 
guest in lobby, CBS NEWS (Dec. 28, 2018, 9:08 AM), 
https://www.cbsnews.com/news/portland-oregon-hotel-calls-cops-on-black-
guest-in-lobby/.  
260 Cydney Henderson, Guest says Hilton 'racially profiled' him by calling police 
over lobby phone call, USA TODAY (Dec. 26, 2018  6:52 PM), 
https://www.usatoday.com/story/travel/news/2018/12/26/guest-hilton-racially-
profiled-him-called-police-over-phone-call/2417679002/. 
261 See Michael Brice-Saddler, Oregon hotel fires employees seen on video 
evicting black guest, WASH. POST (Dec. 30, 2018), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/2018/12/29/portland-hotel-fires-
employees-seen-evicting-black-guest-
video/?noredirect=on&utm_term=.b0feeabfa8cd (noting that Massey told the 
security guard that he was a guest and showed the guard and the hotel manager a 
ticket he received after he had checked in with his room number); Nina 
Golgowski, Black Hotel Guest Making A Call In Lobby Accused Of Loitering, 
Loses His Room, HUFFINGTON POST, (Dec. 27, 2018), 
https://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/hotel-calls-police-on-black-guest-
making-call-in-lobby-guest_us_5c24e157e4b08aaf7a8e2bad; Mihir Zaveri, 
Doubletree in Portland Fires 2 Employees After Kicking Out Black Man Who 
Made Call From Lobby, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 28, 2018), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/12/28/us/black-man-kicked-out-hotel-
portland.html ("Mr. Massey said that he left the hotel after collecting his things 
from his room so as “not to make a bad situation worse,” then drove himself to a 
nearby Sheraton."). 
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asked to leave or having the police called on them. I’m also sure 
many a non-black student has fallen asleep in the common area of 
their residence hall without having someone call the police to 
investigate if they belonged there.  
In each of the above instances, racial bias—whether explicit or 
implicit—likely played a role in bringing about police involvement 
in the first place and how the responding officers handled the 
situation once on the scene. Under Justice Rehnquist’s definition of 
probable cause, an arrest in any of these cases would likely be 
considered justifiable, as police could easily meet Justice 
Rehnquist’s very low threshold of suspicion to justify almost any 
arrest. While several of these incidents did not result in an arrest, the 
fact remains that another set of officers may have chosen to exercise 
their arrest discretion differently and under Justice Rehnquist’s 
definition of probable cause, would likely have had the law on their 
side had they decided to effectuate an arrest.262   
In another case that may not be as widely recognized as the 
Starbucks incident, but is in some ways much more significant from 
a legal perspective because it was the subject of a 2018 U.S. 
Supreme Court decision on probable cause, twenty-one African 
Americans attending a party in Northeast D.C. were arrested and 
taken into custody and charged with unlawful entry. In District of 
Columbia v. Wesby, the Supreme Court reversed an almost $1 
million damages award in favor of sixteen of the twenty-one 
partygoers who sued the District of Columbia and five police 
officers for false arrest under the Fourth Amendment.263   
According to the Court, at “[a]round 1 a.m. on March 16, 2008, 
the District’s Metropolitan Police Department received a complaint 
about loud music and illegal activities at a house in Northeast 
D.C.”264 According to the caller, the house had been vacant for 
several months, a fact that several other neighbors confirmed with 
police when they arrived at the house.265 The officers “approached 
the house and . . . heard loud music playing inside.”266 Upon entering 
the house, the officers smelled marijuana and saw beer bottles and 
cups of liquor on the dirty floor.267 In the living room, the officers 
found several scantily dressed women with cash in their garter belts 
giving lap dances to men holding cash and cups of alcohol.268 When 
                                                             
262 In many states, refusing to leave a business’ premises after being asked to leave 
constitutes trespass. [add citation] 
263 District of Columbia v. Wesby, 138 S. Ct. 577 (2018) (slip opinion at 4–5). 
264 Wesby, slip op. at 1. 
265 Id. 
266 Id. 
267 Id. at 2. The officers knocked on the front door, and one of the partygoers 
answered and let the officers into the house. Id. 
268 Id. 
 
53 PROBABLE CAUSE WITH TEETH [August-15-19] 
 
 
 
they saw the uniformed officers, several partygoers scattered.269 
Upstairs, the officers found a naked woman and several men in a 
bedroom with a mattress on the floor.270 Several open condom 
wrappers and lit candles were on the floor of the bedroom.271  
When asked by police, several partygoers said they were there 
for a bachelor party but, according to the police, could not identify 
the bachelor.272 Eventually, the officers learned that a woman named 
Peaches had organized the party.273 When contacted by police, 
Peaches said she had left the party to go to the store; she also told 
police she was renting the house.274  
The police then reached out to the owner of the house who 
confirmed that he had been trying to negotiate a lease with Peaches, 
but they had failed to reach an agreement.275 The owner also told 
officers that he had not given Peaches or anyone else permission to 
use his house for a party.276 After speaking with the owner of the 
house, the officers arrested the partygoers for unlawful entry and 
transported them to the police station where they were charged with 
disorderly conduct.277  
The partygoers were later released and the charges were 
eventually dropped.278 That the charges were ultimately dropped 
suggests prosecutors realized either that it would be difficult to 
prove the elements of unlawful entry279 or that prosecuting these 
young black men for such a minor offense would widely be viewed 
as an unwise use of scarce prosecutorial resources.  
                                                             
269 Id. 
270 Id. 
271 Id. 
272 Id. 
273 Id. 
274 Id.  
275 Id. 
276 Id. Peaches later admitted that she did not actually have permission to use the 
house. Id. 
277 Id. 
278 Id. 
279 To obtain a conviction for unlawful entry, the government would have had to 
prove five elements beyond a reasonable doubt: (1) the defendants voluntarily or 
purposely (not by accident or mistake), (2) entered a private dwelling, (3) without 
lawful authority, (4) against the will of the person lawfully in charge, and (5) the 
defendants knew or should have known the entry was unlawful. D.C. Code § 22-
3302. The first four elements would have been easy to prove, so the case would 
have turned on whether the defendants knew or should have known their entry 
into the house was unlawful. If the partygoers thought Peaches was renting the 
house and therefore had the right to invite them to the party, they would not have 
had the requisite mens rea for the offense. Likewise, if they had no reason to think 
that someone without authority had invited them to the house, they would not 
have had the required mens rea to be found guilty of unlawful entry. 
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The partygoers sued the District of Columbia and five of its 
officers for false arrest, claiming they were arrested without 
probable cause in violation of the Fourth Amendment and D.C. 
law.280 The partygoers argued that, under D.C. case law, probable 
cause to arrest required that officers have evidence the partygoers 
“knew or should have known, upon entry, that such entry was 
against the will of the owner,” and that the officers lacked such 
evidence.281 On cross-motions for summary judgment, the District 
Court ruled in the partygoers’ favor, concluding that the officers 
lacked probable cause to arrest the partygoers for unlawful entry.282 
A jury awarded the partygoers $680,000 in compensatory 
damages.283 After the District Court awarded attorney’s fees, the 
total award in favor of the partygoers came to almost $1 million.284 
The D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed.285  
In reversing the District Court and the D.C. Circuit Court of 
Appeals’ judgment, the Supreme Court relied primarily on two 
factors: (1) the condition of the house, and (2) the partygoers’ 
conduct to justify its conclusion that the officers had probable cause 
to arrest the partygoers.286 Notably, the Court in Wesby failed to 
recognize that if the officers had come across twenty-one white male 
partygoers doing the same sorts of activities in a more affluent part 
of town, it is unlikely that the officers would have arrested those 
partygoers. During oral argument, Justice Sotomayor was the only 
Justice who suggested this possibility: 
 
JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: Mr. Kim, I don’t know if I agree 
completely with your opposing counsel that the wealth of the 
neighborhood should make a difference, but I suspect that if 
police officers arrived at a wealthy home and it was white 
teenagers having a party, and one of them says, “my dad just 
bought this house,” that it would be very – and I told the kids 
they could have a party, and it became, Joe told me to come, and 
Larry King told me to come, and X King told me to come, that 
those kids wouldn't be arrested. Maybe the kid who lied might 
be, but I doubt very much those kids would be arrested. . . . 
 
[S]houldn’t we have a rule that if we’re going to require mens 
rea at all, that police officers should be treating people equally?  
 
                                                             
280 Wesby, slip op. at 4. 
281 Id. at 5. See also supra note 279 and accompanying text. 
282 Id. at 4. 
283 Id. at 5. 
284 Id. 
285 Id. That all of the lower court judges found for the partygoers suggests that the 
case was not as cut and dry as represented by the Supreme Court. 
286 Id. at 8. 
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District of Columbia v. Wesby, like the Starbucks incident 
discussed earlier, illustrates that police officers have broad arrest 
power. Since officers have limited resources, they cannot and will 
not use this power to arrest everyone who is eligible to be arrested. 
The lower the showing required for probable cause, the more 
discretion police officers have to arrest whomever they choose. As 
Devon Carbado observes: 
 
[P]recisely because [loitering, sleeping in a public place, 
panhandling, drinking in public, jaywalking, riding bicycles on 
the sidewalk, etc.] are non-serious or vague, police officers will 
have little difficulty establishing the requisite probable cause to 
justify arresting people from committing them. For example, if 
the law criminalizes jaywalking, and people regularly jaywalk, 
the question is not whether the police will have probable cause 
(they will because many people jaywalk). Rather, the question 
is whether the police will use that probable cause selectively to 
arrest members of particular groups (for example, African-
Americans). The short of it is that the more law criminalizes 
activities in which many people engage, the wider the pool of 
people from which police officers may pull to make arrests. . . 
[Mass criminalization] provides police officers with the kind of 
perpetual probable cause that they can use to justify arresting 
African-Americans for a wide range of non-serious activities.287 
 
Along these lines, a 2011 study found that, on average, the 
chance of a nonwhite person being arrested is thirty percent greater 
than the chance of a white person being arrested.288 Moreover, even 
though blacks make up only approximately 13.4 percent of the total 
population in the United States,289 in 2017, blacks constituted 27.2 
percent of all federal arrestees, more than double the percentage of 
blacks in the total population.290  
 
Given the statistics and cases discussed above, it is clear that 
race plays a role both in the exercise of police officers’ arrest 
discretion and in post-hoc judicial affirmation of this probable 
                                                             
287 Devon Carbado, Predatory Policing, 83 UMKC L. REV. 545, 550-51 (2017). 
288 Tammy Rinehart Kochel, David B. Wilson & Stephen D. Mastrofski, Effect of 
Suspect Race on Officers Arrest Decisions, 49 CRIMINOLOGY 473, 498 (2011). 
289 U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, QUICKFACTS (July 2018), 
https://www.census.gov/quickfacts/fact/table/US/PST045218. 
290 U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, FED. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, UNIFORM CRIME 
REPORT: CRIME IN THE UNITED STATES, 2017, https://ucr.fbi.gov/crime-in-the-
u.s/2017/crime-in-the-u.s.-2017/tables/table-43/. 
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cause.291 Contrast the arrests of the African American men at 
Starbucks and the African American partygoers in Wesby, where 
there seemed to be no disagreement that police had the requisite 
probable cause to make those arrests, with the commentary 
surrounding the issuance of a search warrant to search the home and 
office of Michael Cohen, President Donald Trump’s former attorney 
in April 2018.  When a judicial officer is asked to issue a search 
warrant, the judicial officer must find there is probable cause to 
believe evidence of a crime will be found at the place to be searched. 
The amount of proof needed to establish probable cause to search is 
usually considered to be the same as the showing required for 
probable cause to arrest.292  
When attorney Michael Cohen’s home and office were searched 
pursuant to a search warrant issued by a judicial officer, many 
commentators spoke as if the showing necessary for probable cause 
is a very rigorous standard, a far cry from Justice Rehnquist’s 
definition of probable cause as something less than a preponderance 
of the evidence. For example, Danny Cevallos, a criminal defense 
attorney and legal analyst for NBC News/MSNBC commented, 
“‘Probable cause’ means the FBI would have to demonstrate to a 
magistrate that there was a substantial chance evidence of criminal 
activity would be found in Cohen's offices, or in a hotel where he 
was living, which was also searched.”293  
                                                             
291 See Jerry Kang, et al., Implicit Bias in the Courtroom, 59 UCLA L. Rev. 1124 
(2012) (noting that implicit biases can influence whether a police officer decides 
to stop an individual for questioning, whether the officer interrogates or frisks 
that individual, and whether the officer decides to arrest that individual or simply 
give her a warning); L. Song Richardson, Arrest Efficiency and the Fourth 
Amendment, 95 MINN. L. REV. 2035 (2011) (explaining how the operation of 
implicit racial biases can cause the police to target, stop, and search Blacks more 
often than Whites); Angela J. Davis, Racial Fairness in the Criminal Justice System: 
The Role of the Prosecutor, 39 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 202 (2007) (noting that 
race “may affect the existence of a prior criminal record even in the absence of 
recidivist tendencies on the part of the suspect because of racial profiling in at 
the arrest stage of the process”). 
292 2 Wayne R. LaFave, Search and Seizure § 3.1(b) (5th ed. 2012) (“It is generally 
assumed by the Supreme Court and the lower courts that the same quantum of 
evidence is required whether one is concerned with probable cause to arrest or 
probable cause to search“). 
293 Danny Cevallos, For Trump and Cohen, attorney-client privilege goes only so 
far, NBC NEWS (Apr. 10, 2018, 4:37 AM) (emphasis added), 
https://www.nbcnews.com/politics/donald-trump/trump-cohen-attorney-
client-privilege-goes-only-so-far-n864206. 
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The fact that this was a search of an attorney’s home and office, 
and not just any attorney—the President’s personal attorney—meant 
the showing of probable cause had to be higher than for the ordinary 
case. As Frank Figliuzzi, former FBI assistant director and current 
MSNBC legal analyst, noted, “. . . it’s really tough to get enough 
probable cause and senior level DOJ approval to search an 
attorney’s office, and so it goes all the way up to DOJ, and you have 
to show there’s a substantial, pertinent reason to believe that 
evidence exists [of a crime].”294  
If we are willing to apply a robust showing of probable cause 
when it comes to searching the home and office of an attorney 
suspected of very serious crimes, shouldn’t we insist on an equally 
or more robust showing of probable cause when police officers 
arrest an individual for a minor offense? Arguably, being arrested 
and taken into custody is a far greater intrusion—a humiliating 
intrusion on an individual’s liberty and dignity interests—than 
having one’s property searched,295 yet we require a higher showing 
and make it more difficult for police when they seek to search the 
property of a wealthy attorney suspected of serious white collar 
crimes than when police seek to arrest black individuals for 
relatively minor offenses. Probable cause should require a showing 
of more than just a preponderance of the evidence.296 
                                                             
294 Deadline: White House (MSNBC television broadcast, Apr. 9, 2018) (emphasis 
added), http://www.msnbc.com/deadline-white-house/watch/fmr-fbi-asst-dir-
michael-cohen-raids-required-substantial-probable-cause-1206702147538.  
295 In United States v. Watson, Justice Powell noted the anomaly created by a 
rule that allows police officers with probable cause to arrest individuals in public 
without a warrant when the general rule in the search context is that officers 
must obtain a warrant prior to searching an individual’s property: 
Since the Fourth Amendment speaks equally to both searches and seizures, and 
since an arrest, the taking hold of one’s person, is quintessentially a seizure, it 
would seem that the constitutional provision should impose the same limitations 
upon arrests that it does upon searches. Indeed, as an abstract matter an 
argument can be made that the restrictions upon arrest perhaps should be 
greater. A search my cause only annoyance and temporary inconvenience to the 
law-abiding citizen. . . . An arrest, however, is a serious personal intrusion 
regardless of whether the person seized is guilty or innocent. . . . Logic therefore 
would seem to dictate that arrests be subject to the warrant requirement at least 
to the same extent as searches. 
  423 U.S. 411, ____ (Powell, J., concurring).  [need to add pincite] 
296 Other legal scholars have suggested good ways to strengthen the showing 
necessary for a search or arrest. Josh Bowers, for example, suggests police should 
take into account qualitative considerations, such as the individual’s dignity, 
rather than simply relying upon quantitative calculations when assessing the 
constitutional reasonableness or unreasonableness of a search or seizure. Josh 
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Conclusion 
 
When Justice Rehnquist suggested more than thirty-five years 
ago in his plurality opinion in Texas v. Brown that probable cause to 
arrest an individual or search one’s property need not be correct or 
even more likely than not, he significantly lowered the bar for 
probable cause. Lower courts should reject Justice Rehnquist’s 
comment on probable cause from Texas v. Brown and insist upon a 
more robust showing for the protection of all civilians, and 
especially for black and brown individuals who are often the 
subjects of police interest. Rather than a trivial showing that 
amounts to less than the preponderance of the evidence standard 
used in civil cases, probable cause to arrest and place someone into 
the criminal justice system should have more teeth. 
                                                             
Bowers, Probable Cause, Constitutional Reasonableness, and the Unrecognized 
Point of a “Pointless Indignity,” 66 STAN. L. REV. 987 (2014). Max Minzner 
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